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Tonja Jacobi†* & Jeff VanDam**
“If this precedent is pushed to its logical conclusion, I suspect
there will come a day when all legislation will be done through
reconciliation.”
— Senator Tom Daschle, on the prospect of using budget
reconciliation procedures to pass tax cuts in 19961
Passing legislation in the United States Senate has become a de facto
super-majoritarian undertaking, due to the gradual institutionalization of
the filibuster — the practice of unending debate in the Senate. The
filibuster is responsible for stymieing many legislative policies, and was
the cause of decades of delay in the development of civil rights protection.
Attempts at reforming the filibuster have only exacerbated the problem.
However, reconciliation, a once obscure budgetary procedure, has created
a mechanism of avoiding filibusters. Consequently, reconciliation is one of
the primary means by which significant controversial legislation has been
passed in recent years — including the Bush tax cuts and much of
Obamacare. This has led to minoritarian attempts to reform
reconciliation, particularly through the Byrd Rule, as well as
constitutional challenges to proposed filibuster reforms.
We argue that the success of the various mechanisms of constraining
either the filibuster or reconciliation will rest not with interpretation by
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the Senate Parliamentarian or judicial review by the courts, but in the
Senate itself, through control of its own rules. As such, the battle between
majoritarian and minoritarian power in the United States Congress
depends upon individual incentives of senators and institutional norms.
We show that those incentives are intrinsically structured toward
minoritarian power, due to: particularism, arising from the salience of
localism; institutionalized risk aversion, created by re-election incentives;
and path dependence, produced by the stickiness of norms. Consequently,
filibuster reform is likely to be continually frustrated, as the 2012–2013
skirmish recently illustrated, and minority dominance will continue unless
there is significant institutional change in Congress. Meanwhile,
reconciliation will become increasingly central to lawmaking, constituting
the primary means of overcoming obstructionism and delay in U.S.
policymaking and social reform.
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INTRODUCTION
On January 18, 1973, a mild-mannered economist named Charles L.
Schultze testified before a joint House-Senate committee on the budget
process, a subject he learned something about as budget director for
President Lyndon B. Johnson.2 The tone was informal; one
congressman told Schultze the committee hoped to “pick [his] brains”
about its task, a “tough challenge and a real assignment as you well
know.”3 That was an understatement: the committee’s charge was to
reformulate the budgetary apparatus of the U.S. Congress.
Over the previous few decades, Members of Congress appeared to
have slowly realized that their budgetary process had become
unsustainable. The body had abandoned budget reform efforts decades
earlier4 and failed to control deficits and reduce spending during the
late 1960s and early 1970s.5 In response, President Richard Nixon had
effectively commandeered the budget process during his first term,
impounding social program funds that Congress had appropriated.6
The ensuing discussion, driven by congressional panic, had focused
on the need for a ceiling on spending each year. Among Schultze’s
proposals was a way to make Congress’s spending decisions line up
with a spending target. His first idea was to establish standing budget
committees to set initial spending targets as the president had always
done. The second proposal was for a new type of legislation — he
called it a “final budget reconciliation bill” — which would force all of
2
See David Baumann, The End of the Line for EF-100, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (May
17, 2001), http://newlive.nationaljournal.com/members/buzz/2001/capitolcorridors/
051701.htm; Todd S. Purdum, Can They Deliver?, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1994, at CY1.
3
Improving Congressional Budget Control: Hearings Before the Joint Study
Committee on Budget Control, 93rd Cong. 1 (1973) (statement of Rep. Al Ullman).
4
See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal
Budget Process, 35 HARV. J. LEGIS. 387, 442 n.143 (1998) [hereinafter Rethinking the
Structures] (describing failures and abandonment of centralization of the
congressional budgetary process from 1946–1951).
5
See Charles Tiefer, How to Steal a Trillion: The Uses of Laws About Lawmaking,
17 J.L. & POLS. 409, 427 (2001).
6
See Joseph J. Hogan, Ten Years After: The US Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 63 PUB. ADMIN. 133, 134 (1985).
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the spending that congressional committees proposed throughout the
year to reconcile with the new committees’ initial targets. The bill
would contain all of those legislative ideas and adjust the funds
allocated to them to meet Congress’s spending goals. “At the end of
the year you are going to need a reconciliation bill,” Schultze said,
“and that consists of adjusting those piecemeal actions to the total.”7
Congress adopted Schultze’s reconciliation proposal in 1974. Nearly
forty years later, his simple idea for controlling a budget, run amok, is
frequently used in the U.S. Congress. In fact, reconciliation has
transformed the way Congress does business. However, the reason has
little to do with deficits, the budget, or separation of powers.
Reconciliation has become a primary focus (and sometimes the
primary focus) of business in the Senate for one reason: a
reconciliation bill cannot be filibustered. No senator may block it by
threatening to speak endlessly, a threat that normally requires 60 votes
to defeat — meaning reconciliation bills need just a simple majority to
pass. That one feature has prompted senators without 60 votes for
their proposals to shoehorn their legislation into filibuster-proof
reconciliation bills. Thus, a small budgetary mechanism is transformed
into a critical procedural weapon for Senate majorities to use against
minoritarian tactics. In other words, to quote Senator Robert Byrd,
“[r]econciliation is a nonfilibusterable ‘bear trap.’”8
Neither Schultze nor those who promoted his package of budget
reforms anticipated that reconciliation would move into its current
role — it was “little noticed” at the time it was adopted.9 But Members
of Congress have taken note. Many of the major legislative battles of
the previous decade involved reconciliation bills in a central role,
including, notably, President George W. Bush’s tax cuts and President
Barack Obama’s health care reform. Reconciliation, as a filibusterproof mechanism for passage, was the deciding factor in each,
prompting partisan enmity and even suggestions that its use in such
situations is unconstitutional.10 The deployment of reconciliation in
7

93rd Cong. 14 (statement of Charles L. Schultze).
147 CONG. REC. S1533 (2001). Byrd explained further: “It is a bear trap because
of the fast-track procedures that were included in the Congressional Budget Act to
help Congress enact quickly necessary changes in spending or in revenues to ensure
the integrity of the budget resolution targets.” Id. He proved just as eloquent on other
occasions: “A reconciliation bill is a super gag rule, the foremost ever created by this
institution. Normal cloture is but an infinite speck on the distant horizon when
compared with a reconciliation bill.” 135 CONG. REC. S13356 (1989).
9
Tiefer, supra note 5, at 428.
10
See, e.g., Orrin Hatch, Reconciliation on Health Care Would Be an Assault to the
Democratic Process, WASH. POST, March 2, 2010, at A15 (predicting that the potential
8
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these circumstances has cut squarely against the idea that in the
Senate, “just about all matters, controversial or not, require a threefifths majority.”11 In other words, this use of reconciliation has cut
against the concept of unadulterated minoritarian power that exists
under the filibuster.
Despite these complaints, and given the result of the 2012
presidential and congressional elections — with the Senate majority
held by the president’s party, but lacking a “filibuster-proof”
supermajority — reconciliation is poised to retain its importance for
years to come. Reliance on reconciliation will only increase following
the failure of filibuster reform in early 2013. Scholars in political
science have recognized that reconciliation constitutes a means to
“force a high volume of legislative product through the sausage
works.”12 But the growing relevance of reconciliation has received
minimal attention within legal academia, even while the procedural
weapon has drifted profoundly from its origins in Mr. Schultze’s
modest budgetary proposal and become the enabler of both significant
tax cuts and Obamacare. However, the failure to appreciate the
operation of this procedural mechanism means having little
conception of how most important, controversial law is likely to be
created in the near to medium future.
In that spirit, this Article provides a detailed assessment of the
filibuster and its current foil, the reconciliation process. The former
began its life as a cap on unlimited debate, but has had the effect of
entrenching and institutionalizing minority power. The filibuster has
become the central mechanism of gridlock and delay in the U.S.
Senate. The latter was conceived as a simple fiscal device, but has
morphed by necessity into the primary enabler of majorities in the
Senate against minoritarian interests. In analyzing the filibuster and
reconciliation, then, this Article examines whether minoritarian or
majoritarian power is ultimately likely to win out in the U.S. Senate.
This analysis is highly salient. The number of filibusters has reached
record levels during the Obama Administration.13 The filibuster itself
use of reconciliation to pass President Barack Obama’s health care plan “would
threaten our system of checks and balances, corrode the legislative process, degrade
our system of government and damage the prospects of bipartisanship”); see also
discussion infra Part IV.A.
11
Ezra Klein, Let’s Talk: The Move to Reform the Filibuster, NEW YORKER, Jan. 28,
2013, at 24.
12
William G. Dauster, The Congressional Budget Process, in FISCAL CHALLENGES: AN
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO BUDGET POLICY 1, 30 (Elizabeth Garrett et al. eds.,
2009).
13
See Klein, supra note 11, at 24 (“From 1917 to 1970, the majority sought
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has come to define a new status quo for congressional action,
particularly in an era of increased party discipline. The growing
institutionalization
of
this
extra-constitutional-supermajority
requirement has in turn inspired renewed movement in the Senate for
filibuster reform. The possibility of reform commanded significant
attention during the “fiscal cliff” negotiations between President
Obama and congressional Republicans in late 2012; editorial pages,
and even television comedies, debated the merits of overhauling the
filibuster after the election.14 Nevertheless, the massive watering down
of the most recent efforts at reform was predictable; such ambitions
have been voiced previously, to little effect.15 The reason for this stasis
goes beyond the usual intransigence of the Senate. Despite its effect of
thwarting Senate majorities, there are institutional incentives for
senators collectively to support the ongoing existence of the filibuster.
We lay out three institutional incentives that push away from
filibuster reform: particularism, risk aversion, and path dependence
arising from the stickiness of norms. First, the localized structure of
the constituency-based electoral system incentivizes particularized
benefits, raising the salience of each senator’s state benefits over
institutional reform. Second, this in turn promotes a kind of
institutionalized risk aversion, whereby negating action as a minority
has greater value than proposing action as part of the majority. Third,
even if these incentives are inadequate to promote a minoritarian
norm, the difficulty of changing norms — the stickiness — helps to
maintain them. Together, these factors explain the staying power of
the filibuster, why only a stealth reform such as reconciliation can
meaningfully change it, and why minoritarian pressures against
reconciliation, particularly the Byrd Rule, nonetheless arise.
Those opposing filibuster reform do not tend to point to these
arguably dysfunctional institutional incentives. Rather, they typically
turn to lofty rhetoric about the Madisonian ideal of countercloture fifty-eight times. Since the start of President Obama’s first term, it has sought
cloture more than two hundred and fifty times.”).
14
See Seung Min Kim, Filibuster Fight Seizes Senate, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 2012, 3:36
PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/84237.html; Editorial, A New Chance
for the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A26; Jon Stewart, The Men Who Stall on
Votes, DAILY SHOW (Dec. 3, 2012), http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mondecember-3-2012/the-men-who-stall-on-votes.
15
When Democrats took over the Senate in 1995, for example, their new majority
leader, Tom Daschle, had campaigned on an anti-filibuster abuse platform — calling it
“one of the most abused parliamentary tools in the Senate” — yet did nothing about
removing it; filibusters actually rose during his first term as leader. See KEITH
KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 95 (1996).
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majoritarianism. However, unlike the rest of the separation-of-powers
scheme, there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that requires a
supermajoritarian voting rule in either chamber of Congress.16
Nonetheless, even if filibuster reform and reconciliation are
questionable in terms of their constitutionality,17 U.S. Supreme Court
precedent strongly suggests that judicial oversight is unlikely to be
forthcoming.18 Without such oversight, a simple majority can
effectively decide that all that is required to change the rules is a
majority — not because of subtleties of the law or grand ideals, but
because they can. This fact does not mean that the filibuster will never
be reformed, only that whether reform will occur depends on politics,
not law. But that political effect will set ground rules for passage of all
laws.
Part I of this Article describes the filibuster: its origins — how it
became cemented in the Senate even as it fell away in the House of
Representatives; its impact — empowering Senate minorities to freeze
legislation for decades; and its reform attempts — including the many
complex procedural mechanisms involved in its alteration. The
filibuster is a creation of Congress that has drifted far from its original
moorings, to the point where actual talking filibusters occur only in
the rarest circumstances, and yet 60 votes are required to defeat one.19
Attempts at its reform have been continually frustrated because, we
16

The Constitution contains no majority or alternative requirement for the
passage of legislation and allows Congress to make its own rules. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a
Member.”).
17
In the spring of 2012, for example, Common Cause filed a lawsuit against Vice
President Joe Biden, among others. The group claimed that the 2010 filibuster against
the DREAM Act, which was designed to facilitate legal status for immigrant children
who grew up in the United States, was unconstitutional in that it was not majoritarian.
See Complaint at 1, Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. May 14,
2012) (No. 12-775), 2012 WL 1672642, at *1. The Senate filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the suit presented a non-justiciable
political question. See Motion to Dismiss, Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9
(D.D.C. July 20, 2012) (No. 12-cv-00775), 2012 WL 1672642, at *1; infra, text
accompanying note 300.
18
See discussion infra Part IV.
19
As the recent fight over the confirmation of former senator Chuck Hagel as
Secretary of Defense illustrated, it is currently impossible to tell whether a filibuster is
even occurring in the Senate. See Rachel Weiner, Why Republicans Won’t Call the Hagel
Filibuster a Filibuster, WASH. POST: THE FIX (Feb. 13, 2013, 4:15 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/02/13/so-are-republicansfilibustering-chuck-hagel-or-not/. However, it should be noted that nominations such
as Hagel’s are not eligible for inclusion in reconciliation bills.
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argue, the drive toward minoritarian power is entrenched in the
interests of the majority of senators. As a result, the filibuster has only
grown in power — at least until reconciliation appeared to challenge
its authority.
Part II introduces the reconciliation process, identifying its origins
and the intentions of those who put it in place, and how it has become
the counter to the filibuster. It examines the actual operation of
reconciliation in the context of overall budget procedure, and the shift
of reconciliation away from its roots as a tool for budget hawks,
towards a mechanism of overcoming filibusters to pass broad policy
initiatives.
Part III considers the political and legal significance of these two
intertwined devices. It examines the prominent episodes during the
Reagan, Bush, and Obama Administrations that mark the development
of reconciliation and illustrate how reconciliation can be used to great
strategic effect. It shows how with reconciliation, majorities in the
Senate have finally found an opportunity, albeit a limited one, to assert
themselves over the prevailing minority powers in their chamber. This
Part also chronicles how minorities have attempted to reassert
themselves and limit the reach of reconciliation. The “Byrd [R]ule,”20 a
tool adopted in 1985 to rein in “extraneous” and deficit-exploding
uses of reconciliation, also played a role in those recent episodes, with
mixed success. Thus, Part III demonstrates that both minoritarian and
majoritarian options now exist.
Part IV considers which will ultimately triumph. It first reviews the
arguments that, on one hand, the filibuster is unconstitutional as a
majority-thwarting device, and on the other, that its reform would
constitute an unconstitutional oppression of a legislative minority. We
argue that neither position is likely to receive significant judicial
support, because the courts strongly prefer to avoid reviewing
legislative chambers’ interpretation of their own rules, with good
reason. Although there are exceptions to this principle, as we detail,
filibuster legislation is unlikely to fit any of them. In addition, this Part
describes how the Parliamentarian, although technically the
interpreter of Senate rules, does not offer a meaningful check on the
majority. The Parliamentarian can and has been fired for opposing the
majority on salient policies. As such, the fate of the filibuster, and the
consequent strength of minoritarian power, rests with the Senate
majority. The best predictor of the success of filibuster reform, then,
rests on the institutional incentives we identify in Part II.

20

See 2 U.S.C. § 644 (2012).
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There are no cases about reconciliation and, as mentioned, little
scholarly legal consideration of its significance. Yet reconciliation is a
law itself, ensconced in the United States Code, and has been deployed
to enact many of the same laws that legal academicians do debate
about.21 Perhaps more fundamentally, given the significant difference
in the number of votes required for each, the question of whether
reconciliation or the filibuster governs the passage of legislation goes
to the very heart of how, and whether, our laws are created. Yet since
the legal status of these “meta-laws” is likely to be considered a
political question by the courts, their ultimate fate, and thus the
transcendent question of how many votes are required to pass federal
legislation, will be determined by structural incentives and sheer
political might.
I.

THE FILIBUSTER: MINORITARIAN WEAPON

As the most recent attempt at filibuster reform illustrated, the
filibuster has become so ingrained in the Senate that senators are
unable to defeat it through typical rule-changing means.22 But if the
filibuster causes such consternation among the majorities whose
objectives it stymies, why do majorities not assert themselves over the
supermajority requirement of the filibuster? This Part describes the
somewhat accidental manner in which the filibuster arose as one of
the core mechanisms of minoritarian power, and then describes the
failure of repeated attempts at its reform. Ultimately, this Part argues
that despite being a vehicle for minoritarianism, the filibuster owes its
ongoing existence to the incentives of the majority to maintain it.
A. “The Most Infamous Rule”: Unlimited Debate and Cloture
1.

The House Filibuster

Before a discussion of filibustering in the Senate, which will demand
the bulk of our attention, it is important to note that unlimited debate
was not always exclusive to one house of Congress. Though senators
have liked to argue that the “necessary evil” of the filibuster was the
one thing keeping the Senate from “becom[ing] a mere appendage of

21

Such as health care reform. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Affordable Convergence:
“Reasonable Interpretation” and the Affordable Care Act, 126 HARV. L. REV. 117, 119-20
(2012); Kevin C. Walsh, The Ghost that Slayed the Mandate, 64 STAN. L. REV. 55, 57
(2012).
22
See discussion infra Part I.B.
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the House of Representatives,”23 the House, too, once had what would
today be called a filibuster, along with multiple minoritarian tactics
that flummoxed majorities for decades.
The practice began in 1789, when the House adopted a rule that
bills should be debated in both the Committee of the Whole and on
the floor. This gave House members, like senators, the privilege of
unlimited debate. In fact, its use was more characteristic of the early
House than the early Senate, with House members filibustering twice
as much as their Senate counterparts during the 1800s.24 This practice
rendered the House, for the first century of its existence, in the words
of the powerful late nineteenth-century Speaker Thomas Brackett
Reed, “the most unwieldy parliamentary body in the world.”25 Yet in
1841, House members voted to limit representatives to one hour of
debate per person per bill.26 In so doing, they were willing to impose
limits on minority power in a way the Senate has never done in nearly
two and a half centuries.
The few decades needed to reform the House filibuster may seem
quick and efficient compared to the still-incomplete efforts to limit or
eliminate the filibuster in the Senate. However, reform in the House
did require some time as well as circumstances of exceptional conflict.
A brief account of this process illustrates the difficulty that reform in
the Senate has faced, and that is likely to continue to arise.
Some accounts attribute the catalyst for the effort to reform the
House filibuster to Representative John Randolph of Virginia, who
filibustered for over four hours in February 1820 on an amendment to
the Missouri Compromise Bill27 — an event marked unceremoniously
in the Annals of Congress with just two sentences.28 Less than two
23
2 ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE 1789–1989: ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 163 (1991) (“Without the right of unlimited debate, of course,
there would be no filibusters, but there would also be no Senate, as we know it. The
good outweighs the bad, and not all filibusters have been bad, even though they may
have been exasperating, contentious, and perceived as iniquitous.”).
24
Gregory Koger, The Rise of the 60-Vote Senate, EXTENSIONS, Winter 2012, at 2
[hereinafter 60-Vote Senate].
25
JAMES GRANT, MR. SPEAKER!: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THOMAS B. REED: THE MAN
WHO BROKE THE FILIBUSTER 268 (2011).
26
See ASHER C. HINDS, RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: WITH NOTES ON
THE PRACTICE THEREUNDER 155 (1909).
27
ASHER C. HINDS, HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES 24 (1907) [hereinafter PRECEDENTS].
28
“Mr. Randolph next rose, and spoke more than four hours against the
amendment, and on the topics connected with it, the subject of restriction, &c. When
he had concluded, (about half-past four o’clock,) an ineffectual motion was made for
the Committee to rise.” 36 ANNALS OF CONG. 1541 (1820).
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months later, a congressman named Stevenson Archer proposed an
amendment, which was never voted upon, to the House rules: “No
member shall speak upon any question longer than an hour at one
time.”29 A similar proposal failed two years later.30 Part of the reason
for the increased rancor during that time was the ascension of the
Whig Party to majorities in both houses, which prompted heavier use
of minoritarian tactics against their legislative goals; the strategy
prompted Henry Clay, the Whig leader in the Senate, to urge his
fellows to “enable the majority to get control of public business.”31
No attempt to curtail unlimited debate succeeded in the House until
1841. The effort was part of a procedural gambit, as the House Rules
Committee had two weeks before being given authority to report
amendments to rules at any time. The committee soon took advantage,
reporting the simple-majority change to the floor, itself enacted by a
simple majority.32 Speaker John White, a Whig, “decided that only a
majority would be required” to enact it, rather than require the thencustomary two-thirds of all members present.33 Reaction was swift and
negative; one member argued that the change, which would allow a
majority to cut off debate, would “arrest free inquiry” and “place the
minority of this House in the hands of a majority, and subject them to
every species of tyranny.”34 After much rancor, the House voted to
allow a majority to cut off debate.
The rule was soon followed by another, limiting speakers to an hour
on each bill.35 Representative Robert Rhett attempted to break the rule
immediately, but was shouted down by his colleagues soon after
declaring that “this tyrannical act of the majority not only violated the
rights of the minority on that floor, but the rights of the people at
home.”36 A few days later, reminded that he had been speaking for an
hour and thus “run his race,” Representative Francis Pickens
lambasted the new rule as “the most infamous rule ever passed by any
legislative body.”37 Yet the rule stuck.

29

36 ANNALS OF CONG. 2093 (1820).
See HINDS, PRECEDENTS, supra note 27, at 24.
31
Thomas P. Gill, A Parliament or a Congress?, 53 CONTEMP. REV. 757, 761 (1888).
32
See Committee on Rules: A History, COMM. ON RULES, http://archives.democrats.
rules.house.gov/110/comm_history.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2013).
33
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 153 (1841).
34
Id. (statement of Rep. William Medill).
35
See HINDS, PRECEDENTS, supra note 27, at 24.
36
CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong., 1st Sess. 155 (1841).
37
Id. at 164.
30
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Nevertheless, the imposition of the majority’s ability to end debate
did not mark the end of dilatory tactics in the House. Its members
craftily employed other methods that empowered minorities to stop
legislation (or legislators) from doing things they opposed. Far from
“inoculat[ing] the chamber from filibustering,”38 the previous question
motion still left open several maneuvers, such as the “disappearing
quorum.” This practice is defined as “members refusing to vote despite
their obvious presence to deliberately stop legislative business for lack
of sufficient members voting to constitute a quorum.”39 And the
practice was popular — so much so that Abraham Lincoln, himself,
once instigated it in the Illinois legislature by deciding to jump out of
a first-floor window.40
This practice was not to survive the Speakership of Thomas Reed,
who was elected leader of the House Republicans in 1889. In 1890,
Reed was able to convince his fellow Republicans to help him end the
disappearing quorum, along with several other delaying tactics, thanks
to a unique confluence of several factors. Not only was control of
government unified in Republican hands by 1890, but there was also
public outrage over congressional inactivity, the consolidation of
congressional Republicans behind Reed’s leadership, and a strong
Republican desire to change American trade policy.41 Furthermore,
Reed seemed particularly adept at ramming through change; he
achieved defeat of the disappearing quorum within two months of his
ascension to Speaker by ordering the House Clerk to note the presence
of non-voting Democrats, thereby achieving a quorum.42 His action to
count the Democrats was backed up by an extraordinarily partisan
vote of 162–0, with only Republicans supporting the move and no
Democrats voting.43
The House was thus much quicker to act than the Senate at limiting
debate and other dilatory tactics; in fact, use of the filibuster has
actually expanded in the Senate in the past several decades, after
attempts at reform were made. Yet while the combination of events in
the House that led to the end of unlimited debate and the disappearing
38

Koger, 60-Vote Senate, supra note 24, at 2.
Richard G. Forgette, Reed’s Rules and the Partisan Theory of Legislative
Organization, 29 POLITY 375, 383 (1997).
40
See GRANT, supra note 25, at 150.
41
See generally Forgette, supra note 39, at 385-94 (analyzing the House reforms
under Speaker Reed in 1890 using the principal-agent framework).
42
GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE
HOUSE AND SENATE 54 (2010).
43
ERIC SCHICKLER, DISJOINTED PLURALISM: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. CONGRESS 281, tbl.B.1 (2001).
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quorum were unusual, similar strong leadership and eras of intense
partisan conflict have occurred in the Senate, but the chamber has still
not squelched unlimited debate, nor consequently, minoritarian
power. The following sections describe the history of the filibuster in
the Senate and consider what it is about the Senate that has allowed
the filibuster to continue unabated.
2.

The Senate Filibuster

The right of unlimited debate in the Senate is often said to be a
cherished tradition,44 but in the early Congresses, the filibuster may
not have existed. There were no rules to prevent members from giving
endless speeches, but to do so was considered unseemly, as “selfrestraint and patience” were sought-after virtues.45 In general, scholars
are uncertain of the extent to which speaking at length was a common
dilatory tactic in the early Republic.46 They often quote Thomas
Jefferson’s manual of parliamentary practice for the Senate, which
required that “[n]o one is to speak impertinently or beside the
question, superfluously or tediously”47 — advice that might also have
a place in today’s Senate. Nonetheless, in 1806, the Senate abolished
the ability of its members to curtail debate by forbidding motions for
the previous question — although the motion had not been used
much before then.48
The Senate formally adopted a right of unlimited debate in 1856,
just three years after the term “filibuster” — a word from the Spanish
filibustero, meaning pirates49 — was applied to an episode of verbal

44

See BYRD, supra note 23, at 162-63.
See KOGER, supra note 42, at 60.
46
See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
189 (1997).
47
THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE, COMPOSED
ORIGINALLY FOR THE USE OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 27 (S.H. Smith 1801)
(1993).
48
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 188.
49
The word originated in the Dutch as “vrijbuiter,” or “freebooter,” and arrived in
the Spanish language as “filibustero”; in both languages, it meant “pirate.” Brady
Harrison, The Young Americans: Emerson, Walker, and the Early Literature of American
Empire, 40 AM. STUD. 75, 94 n.1 (1999); see Timothy Noah, Die, Filibuster, Die: the
Biggest Obstacle to the Obama Agenda, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 6, 2012, at 2
[hereinafter Die, Filibuster, Die]. Nineteenth-century Americans used the term
filibuster to describe a private army that attacks sovereign nations. See Robert E. May,
The Domestic Consequences of American Imperialism: Filibustering and Howard Pyle’s
Pirates, 46 AM. STUD. 37, 37 (2005) (describing the term).
45
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legislative obstruction in Congress.50 For over a century, senators had
no way to stop a filibuster. There was no 60-vote requirement in order
to do so, as there is today. A minority of one senator with the desire to
speak at length could halt business in the Senate at any time. Not even
a supermajority could stop such a speech, but at the same time, “the
threat of obstruction through unlimited debate was hollow for much
of the Senate’s history because senators did not have much to do.”51
While today’s Senate is often criticized as a “do-nothing”52 —
including its inability to pass a budget since 200953 — its laxity pales
compared to the Senates of old. Senators often had time to let the
clock run on filibusters until their proponents exhausted themselves,
as there was not much else to debate.54 What is more, records are such
that scholars are unsure “whether extended debate with dilatory intent
was considered an established practice at this point, or whether it was
simply the bad habit of a few persons.”55 In fact, there is little evidence
that filibusters succeeded in blocking legislation before the 1880s.56
Nevertheless, there was one episode in 1917 that prompted a
change. At the outset of American involvement in World War I,
Democrats had initiated an organized series of filibusters against a bill
to arm American ships against German submarines at the end of the
Senate session — more or less guaranteeing the bill would not pass.57
A furious President Woodrow Wilson referred publicly to these
senators as a “little group of willful men,”58 and a “wave of indignation
50

See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 190-93.
Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 310
(2011).
52
See, e.g., William McGurn, The Do-Nothing Senate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 14, 2012, at
A17 (arguing that presidential candidates in 2012 should campaign against the
Senate’s failure to act on budget, job creation, tax cut, and recess appointment
controversies).
53
See Rosalind S. Helderman & Lori Montgomery, House Republicans Agree to Vote
on Bill to Raise Debt Limit for 3 Months, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 2013, at A1 (“As laid out
to fellow Republicans by House Speaker John A. Boehner (Ohio) in a speech at the
retreat, the goal would be to force Senate Democrats to pass a budget, something they
have failed to do for more than three years.”).
54
See Magliocca, supra note 51, at 310 (noting that the Senate in the 1820s
typically met for three hours, and on fewer than five days per week).
55
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 189.
56
Magliocca, supra note 51, at 309.
57
Gregory Koger, Filibuster Reform in the Senate, 1913–1917, in 2 PARTY, PROCESS,
AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN CONGRESS 220 (David Brady & Mathew McCubbins eds.,
2007) [hereinafter Filibuster Reform].
58
Woodrow Wilson, Text of the President’s Statement to the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 1917, at 1.
51
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at their action . . . stirred the country.”59 The public burned senators in
effigy and sent them death threats. It was then that “[p]ublic pressure
to change the rules of the Senate was probably greater than at any
other time in Senate history.”60
The situation presented a wartime separation-of-powers quandary
that has been replicated at few, if any, times in American history.61 In
response, the Senate passed an amendment to its rules allowing a twothirds majority to shut off debate, a process called “cloture.”62 The
New York Times predicted that the new rule would have an “almost
unlimited potential effect on future legislation.”63 The newspaper was
incorrect, at least in an immediate sense, as “[s]enators rarely
attempted cloture because they developed a general aversion to voting
for it.”64 For the time being, extreme minorities could still effectively
impede the Senate, as no senator was willing to mount a challenge to
stop them. For example, just 8 cloture votes occurred during the
period of 1933 to 1948, and all 8 failed. Senators may have feared
reprisals, and circumvention of cloture votes was generally tolerated.65
It is fairly clear, then, that the institution of cloture had little effect.66
However, it must also be said that majorities regularly passed
legislation in this era; it had simply not come to pass yet that every bill
had the threat of a filibuster hanging over it, as is the case today, and
thus every bill did not have to acquire 60 votes to pass.
True national attention was not trained upon the filibuster until the
Civil Rights Era, particularly during and after southern senators’ 74day verbal attack upon the Civil Rights Act of 1964.67 In response to
southern obstructionism, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield
fielded two solutions that he thought could fix the problem. It was
Mansfield who had allowed the filibusters in response to the Civil
Rights Act,68 and he wanted to avoid similar spectacles.69 Yet his ideas
59

‘Willful Men’ Deny Aiding Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1917, at 3.
Koger, Filibuster Reform, supra note 57, at 220.
61
See, e.g., Left with Power to Arm Ships, President Urges Senate to Change Rules to
Permit Action, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1917, at 1.
62
See KOGER, supra note 42, at 152.
63
Alters Rule of 100 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1917, at 1.
64
KOGER, supra note 42, at 154.
65
Id. at 162-63.
66
Koger, 60-Vote Senate, supra note 24, at 3.
67
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 199-200.
68
See Donald A. Ritchie, The Senate of Mike Mansfield, MONTANA: MAG. OF W.
HIST, Winter 1998, at 50, 58 (describing Mansfield’s actions during civil rights
debate).
69
See Koger, 60-Vote Senate, supra note 24, at 5 (noting Mansfield’s determination
60
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turned out to be spectacularly inept, as they ultimately empowered
minoritarian forces as never before.
First, Mansfield advocated forcing cloture votes on filibuster threats.
He told colleagues that “[t]he only rational remedy under the present
rules remains the procedure of cloture.”70 The strategy hardly
portended victory; only 8 of 51 cloture efforts from 1917 to 1970 had
succeeded.71 There were some wins, such as the Senate’s successful
cloture motion on a filibuster against a draft extension bill in 1971.72
Still, success was not to be permanent, as the shift in emphasis from
attempting to wait out filibusters to forcing immediate votes on them
meant that actual filibusters no longer had to occur. The Senate’s Rule
22, formally requiring a full 60 votes to defeat the filibuster threat,73
ensured that when majorities lacked those 60 votes, minorities could
now instantly halt a piece of legislation.
Compounding the problem, Mansfield implemented a “two-track”
system intended to keep the Senate moving despite filibusters. The
system, installed in 1972 and still in place today, technically allows
filibusters to continue while the chamber considers other legislation.74
The change permitted the majority leader to confine filibustered
matters to mornings, and everything else to the afternoon.75
Eventually, the filibuster material was simply “put aside.”76 Mansfield
implemented this system with the recognition that, unlike Senates of
old, the American welfare state had made floor time especially
valuable, and that filibusters presented the prospect of “perpetual
gridlock” in the face of pressing problems.77 This creation, however,
further spurred the “stealth” or “silent” filibuster, a device much less
costly for a minority to put forth than an actual “talking” filibuster.78
Without the requirement that senators actually stand before the
to avoid similar fights).
70
KOGER, supra note 42, at 172.
71
See Editorial, Can the Senate Control Itself?, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1970, at B6.
72
See Spencer Rich, Filibuster Cut off on Draft, WASH. POST, June 24, 1971, at A1.
73
See Koger, 60-Vote Senate, supra note 24, at 5-6 (extrapolating Mansfield’s
folly).
74
For a description of the system as initially devised, see Fisk & Chemerinsky,
supra note 46, at 201.
75
Id.
76
Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence, & Steven S. Smith, Tracking the Filibuster,
1917 to 1996, 30 AM. POLS. RES. 406, 411 (2002).
77
Magliocca, supra note 51, at 313–14.
78
See Binder, Lawrence & Smith, supra note 76, at 411-12, 415-16 (hypothesizing
that the two-track system decreased the cost of filibustering and thus would have
increased the practice, then formally confirming this theory with data).
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chamber speaking for hours on end, they simply claim to be
filibustering as other business went on. Combined with the 61-vote
cloture requirement to end “debate,” the two-track system means that
“[t]oday a ‘filibuster’ consists of merely telling the leadership that 41
senators won’t vote for a bill.”79 Before unique episodes in 2010 and
2013,80 the last actual filibuster had occurred in 1992.81 But even
though senators no longer have to deliver long-winded stemwinders,
they can still “filibuster” any bill they like, making minorities even
more powerful.
The adoption of two tracks “changed the game profoundly.”82 It was
followed fairly immediately by a period in which there are more
filibusters than ever before. There have been nearly twice as many
Senate actions to defeat filibusters (the cloture motions that end
debate on an issue, and thus end that filibuster) in the last ten sessions
of Congress than in the previous thirty-eight sessions combined. The
number of motions to defeat filibusters from the 103rd Congress
through the 112th was 888; the number from the 65th through the
102nd was 483.83 That the number exploded after the two-track
79
Barry Friedman & Andrew D. Martin, A One-Track Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2010, at A27.
80
Senator Rand Paul of Kentucky revived the filibuster for a day in March 2013
over the Obama Administration’s use of drone strikes. See Rand Paul, My 13 Hours
Were Just the Beginning, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2013, at B1 (describing his filibuster).
While Paul hinted he might also filibuster a potential Senate resolution to allow
President Obama to conduct air strikes in Syria in September 2013, he later
downplayed that possibility. See Ed O’Keefe, Rand Paul Denies Plan to Filibuster Syria
Resolution, WASH. POST: POST POLITICS (Sept. 4, 2013, 2:32 PM), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/09/04/rand-paul-denies-plansto-filibuster-syria-resolution.
81
Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont held the Senate floor for over eight and a
half hours in late 2010 in order to protest a tax cut deal between President Obama and
congressional Republicans. See Michael A. Memoli, Sen. Bernie Sanders Ends Filibuster,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/10/news/la-pnsanders-filibuster-20101211 (noting that Senator Alfonse D’Amato in 1992 was the
last to filibuster before Sanders, singing the song “South of the Border” while doing
so). In a somewhat ironic development, Sanders actually received praise for his
filibuster, because it highlighted the majority party’s unwillingness to force those who
threaten filibusters to actually follow through on them. See, e.g., Michael Tomasky,
The Significance of Bernie Sanders’ Filibuster, GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2010, 4:00 PM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/michaeltomasky/2010/dec/10/berniesanders-filibuster-tax-cuts. See generally BERNIE SANDERS, THE SPEECH: A HISTORIC
FILIBUSTER ON CORPORATE GREED AND THE DECLINE OF OUR MIDDLE CLASS (2012)
(Sanders’s filibuster received so much attention that he actually turned it into a book).
82
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 201.
83
Senate Actions on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
pagelayout/reference/cloture_motions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2012).
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system was adopted is not coincidental. The system of stealth
filibustering “allows [senators] to obstruct Senate business but
without paying much, if any, political cost for doing so.”84 It has led to
a Senate where an invisible filibuster by default hangs over any
controversial legislation, and sixty votes are needed to remove it “in
almost every case.”85 A Senate, in other words, where minorities reign.
B. Edge of the Abyss: The Failure of Filibuster Reform in 2013
The attempt to reform the filibuster in early 2013 provides a good
illustration of what has now become common: outrage over the
thwarting of majorities leads to proposals for reform, which, despite
receiving strong majority and often public support, nonetheless
inevitably peter out in the face of strident minority opposition. This
raises the question of why minority opposition consistently bests the
majority’s impulse for reform. This section describes the latest wrangle
over filibuster reform, and how that has become a familiar tale. The
following section explains why the conclusion of the story has always
been largely the same, one of failure to reform — at least until
reconciliation appeared.
Initially, the prospects for this particular attempt to hamstring the
invisible filibuster appeared favorable, at least compared to previous
efforts. Proponents had identified January 3, 2013, as the day for
action, because Senate traditions permit a simple majority to change
the chamber’s rules on the first day of the legislative session.86 On any
other day, a rule change would itself be subject to filibuster, and so be
self-defeating. Opponents of this procedural approach refer to it as the
“nuclear option,” after a similar failed proposal in 2005,87 because a
supermajority is the overwhelming norm for making changes to the
rules. Proponents preferred to call the maneuver the “constitutional
84
Josh Chafetz & Michael J. Gerhardt, Is the Filibuster Constitutional?, 158 U. PA.
L. REV. PENNUMBRA 245, 256 (2010).
85
Jean Edward Smith, Filibusters: The Senate’s Self-Inflicted Wound, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 2009), http://100days.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/01/filibusters-the-senatesself-inflicted-wound/.
86
See Jonathan Bernstein, The Senate’s Opening Day, WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2010),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/plum-line/2010/12/opening_day.html (“[O]ne Senate
tradition says that it takes 67 votes to change the rules; another says that there’s an
exception, on the first day of a new Congress.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2
(“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”).
87
See Niels Lesniewski, Reid Has 51 Votes to Change Filibuster, Advocates Say, ROLL
CALL (Jan. 3, 2013, 5:14 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/reid_has_51_votes_to_
change_filibuster_advocates_say-220519-1.html (describing the “nuclear option” as
“changing the rules with a simple majority”).
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option,”88 in reference to the provision of the Constitution allowing
the Senate to make its own rules89 — perhaps an odd label, as the
Constitution contains no majority (or supermajority) voting
requirement for such rule changes. Regardless, the “nuclear” label was
a signal of just how noxious pure majority rule had become to many
senators: a majority decision to change the rules had been named after
a potential decision to annihilate an enemy with an apocalyptic blast.90
With both the Democrat majority (but not a supermajority) in the
Senate and the Democrat President being thwarted by a Republican
minority through use of the filibuster, the stage was set for
majoritarian reform using this procedure. The rhetoric after the 2012
presidential election had grown heated enough that the use of the
“nuclear option” was considered likely, even by hardened Senate
watchers.91 Which of a number of possible reforms senators would be
voting on was unclear, however. Liberal Democrat senators had
advanced an ambitious program of reforms with the aim of making the
cost of filibustering much higher. Such reforms included using a
simple majority to implement the “talking filibuster,” requiring
senators to actually filibuster when they want to filibuster — i.e., to
speak for hours on end.92 An alternative, somewhat weaker proposal
being considered would have switched the onus to the filibustering
minority to demonstrate on the Senate floor that it had 41 votes to
filibuster, rather than requiring the majority to round up 60 votes to
end the filibuster.93 But informal lobbying to avoid either change had
88
See Alexander Bolton, Reid to Lay Out Plans for Filibuster Reform, THE HILL (Jan.
22, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/278419-reid-to-lay-outplans-for-filibuster-reform [hereinafter Reid to Lay Out Plans] (“Proponents of the
tactic, such as Sen. Tom Udall (DN.M.), call it the ‘constitutional option,’ arguing
that the Constitution allows the Senate to set its own rules at the start of a new
Congress.”).
89
See Jennifer Steinhauer, Resistance on Method for Curbing Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 2012, at A17 (noting that such a change “is available only on the first day of
a new Congress”).
90
See Mark Leibovich, In the Senate, the Escalation of Rhetoric, WASH. POST, May
17, 2005, at C1 (describing origin and use of term as rooted in annihiliation rhetoric).
91
See Alexandra Jaffe, Warren Pledges to Lead Filibuster Reform, THE HILL BALLOT
BOX (Nov. 15, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senateraces/268267-warren-pledges-to-lead-filibuster-reform (“A vote to change the
filibuster would find little GOP support, and Democrats are likely to use the so-called
constitutional or ‘nuclear’ option to pursue reform, in which Senate rules could be
changed by a majority vote.”).
92
See Ryan Grim, Jeff Merkley Circulates ‘Talking Filibuster’ Reform Proposal, HUFF.
POST (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/12/jeff-merkleyfilibuster-reform_n_2287831.html.
93
Bolton, Reid to Lay Out Plans, supra note 88; Timothy Noah, The Filibuster and
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begun before 2012 had even ended, with senators disseminating the
concern that it would set a precedent for regular rule changes.94 One
bipartisan group of senators, including John McCain and Carl Levin,
made a counterproposal excluding the talking filibuster change, but
scuttling filibusters on motions to proceed to consider legislation. It
did not touch filibusters on actual legislation and also permitted the
minority party two additional amendments on every bill.95 Opponents
of this bipartisan proposal claimed it would “give[ ] even more power
to the minority,” because it did “nothing to solve the heart of the
problem” — the lack of a talking filibuster requirement.96
Still, it appeared for a moment that Senate Majority Leader Reid
might actually consider taking up significant filibuster reform.97 The
reform proposal was gaining momentum, and, more importantly,
votes.98 But soon after 2013 began, signals emerged suggesting that
Reid would opt for the weaker, non-talking filibuster option.99 In
order to buy time to negotiate with Republicans on a more moderate
set of reforms, he employed a parliamentary maneuver that extended
“the Fermata,” THE NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/
blog/plank/112111/the-filibuster-and-the-fermata (arguing that neither change “would
pare back obstruction by the minority party in any meaningful way”).
94
See Manu Raju, Senators Wary of Filibuster ‘Nuclear Option,’ POLITICO (Dec. 9,
2012), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/harry-reid-filibuster-84807.html (“During
floor votes, on the Senate subway and over breakfast meetings, senators from both
parties are quietly trading ideas to avoid the precedent-setting move to alter filibuster
rules with a simple majority — rather than two-thirds — vote.”).
95
Alexander Bolton, Reid Will Postpone Filibuster Reform, THE HILL (Jan. 2, 2013),
http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/275271-reid-will-postpone-filibuster-reformuntil-late-january.
96
Greg Sargent, Filibuster Reform Is in Serious Trouble, WASH. POST: PLUM LINE
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2013/01/02/
filibuster-reform-is-in-serious-trouble/ (quoting Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon, one
of the talking filibuster reform advocates). Merkley argued at the time that “unless
Senators are forced to fully carry out the filibuster in the eye of the public and media,
there will be no political price or disincentive for obstructionism.” Id. (emphasis in
original).
97
See Lesniewski, supra note 87 (noting reform-minded senators’ hopefulness that
Reid could push through talking filibuster reform). This scenario repeated itself later in
2013. See Manu Raju et al., Harry Reid on Nuclear Option: ‘I Ate Sh—’ on Nominees,
POLITICO (July 11, 2013), //www.politico.com/story/2013/07/the-start-of-the-filibustersend-94062.html?hp=f2 (detailing Reid’s July threat to invoke the nuclear option).
98
See Alexander Bolton, Senate Dem Freshmen Want Party Back to ‘Talking Filibuster,’
THE HILL (Jan. 4, 2013), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/275549-senate-democraticfreshmen-call-for-talking-filibuster-set-up-fight-with-old-bulls (noting seven potential
new votes for the talking filibuster plan) [hereinafter Dem Freshmen].
99
Sahil Kapur, Uncertainty over Filibuster Reform Worries Opponents, T.P.M.D.C. (Jan.
3, 2013), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2013/01/filibuster-reform-jeopardy.php.

2013]

The Filibuster and Reconciliation

281

the first day of the legislative session beyond the actual date of January
3rd.100 When the first legislative day resumed on January 22, 2013,
with Republicans’ help, instead of utilizing the nuclear option he put
forth a proposal that largely accepted the recommendations of the
bipartisan group. Reid agreed to the Republican request for the right
to offer at least two amendments when Democrats tried to block them,
and to limiting debate on nominees to lower federal courts and federal
agencies,101 still leaving the onus on the majority party to block a
filibuster.
There appeared to be some public misunderstanding about the
change, as well as about the current status of the filibuster itself. The
“reform,” as the New York Times put it, would still allow senators “to
talk and talk and talk, though for not quite as long as they have grown
accustomed to.”102 But no one ever “talks and talks” anymore when
filibustering; the term now simply refers to a flat minoritarian hold on
any piece of legislation or nomination. The Times, however, did get
one thing right: the reform meant that “[t]he majority will still not
have absolute rule,” and “[t]he minority — currently Republican —
will preserve its ability to force a supermajority of 60 votes to advance
bills.”103
In the end, the defeat of the talking filibuster proposal, while
maintaining minoritarian power in the Senate, was actually antithetical
to the stated goals of its opponents. They often spoke of the Senate’s
role as a “deliberative” body.104 And yet they defeated a reform that
would have necessitated more debate and deliberation in the form of
talking filibusters.105 While such speeches, when they existed, could
cover frivolous matters, they could also contain real substance.106 As
new Senator Tim Kaine put it, the “talking filibuster is what enables

100

See generally Manu Raju, Harry Reid Delays Call on Filibuster Overhaul, POLITICO
(Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/reid-delays-call-on-filibusteroverhaul-85692.html.
101
Id.
102
Jeremy W. Peters, New Senate Rules to Curtail the Excesses of the Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/politics/bipartisanfilibuster-deal-is-reached-in-the-senate.html.
103
Id.
104
See, e.g., Editorial, Filibuster Follies, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2013), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/feb/1/filibuster-follies/ (“Though certainly not
ideal, the changes preserve the upper chamber’s intended role as a deliberative body.”).
105
See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 761 (2012)
(noting that the filibuster “no longer has much of anything to do with debate”).
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See supra note 81 and accompanying text (detailing Senator Bernie Sanders’s
admirably quixotic talking filibuster of 2010).
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your colleagues and the American public to know whether you’re
interposing some reason for delay or you’re just interested in delay for
delay’s sake.”107 Without filibuster reform, the public will never know.
Some observers predicted that it would take another Civil Rights Actstyle “galvanizing” filibuster to spur real reform,108 but such
observations miss the point; if the public can never see a filibuster,
they can never be galvanized against it. Less than two weeks after the
package passed, Republicans in the Senate were already intimating
that they would filibuster against confirming former Senator Chuck
Hagel as President Obama’s Secretary of Defense, which they
subsequently did. This was the first filibuster of a Defense Secretary in
history,109 and a breach of the reform deal that Senator Reid and the
Republicans had just reached.110
Why, then, did Reid retreat? He told the Washington Post, “I’m not
personally, at this stage, ready to get rid of the 60-vote threshold.”111
One reason was that he did “not want to start the new Congress on a
sourly partisan note and would prefer to negotiate a bipartisan
alternative.”112 But previous efforts to establish a “gentlemen’s
agreement” — including just a year earlier at the start of the 112th
Congress — had not worked,113 as Reid well knew. However, Reid was
not alone: several prominent senior Democrat senators — just as a
reminder, they were in the majority — had “balked” at changing the
107

Bolton, Dem Freshmen, supra note 98.
E.g., Scott Lemieux, What Killed Filibuster Reform?, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 25,
2013), http://prospect.org/article/what-killed-filibuster-reform (“The fact that giving
up the filibuster requires that most senators give up power means that real filibuster
reform will probably require a galvanizing issue (like the filibusters of civil-rights bills
that caused the supermajority requirements to be reduced).”).
109
See Jeremy Herb & Ramsey Cox, Senate Republicans Block Hagel Nomination for
Defense Secretary, THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/army/
283279-senate-gop-blocks-hagel-nomination-in-vote#ixzz2LDjPQkB7 (quoting Senator
Reid’s claim to that effect).
110
See Megan Scully & Meredith Shiner, The GOP’s Hagel Dilemma: To Filibuster,
or Not to Filibuster, ROLL CALL (Feb. 1, 2013), www.rollcall.com/news/the_gops_
hagel_dilemma_to_filibuster_or_not_to_filibuster-222096-1.html (“Several Cabinet
nominees have failed to win the backing of a majority of senators — and others have
withdrawn their names before reaching the Senate floor — but a filibuster would mark
a serious breach in the unwritten protocol that governs the Senate. Such a challenge
could also disrupt the deal reached last month between Democratic and Republican
leaders to overhaul the filibuster.”).
111
Paul Kane, Senate Leaders Agree on Filibuster Changes, WASH. POST (Jan. 24,
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-01-24/politics/36520219_1_filibusterrules-filibuster-vote-senate-majority-leader.
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Bolton, Reid to Lay Out Plans, supra note 88.
113
See id.
108

2013]

The Filibuster and Reconciliation

283

rule.114 Although Republicans had threatened Reid that a “nuclear”
move would harm talks on the budget and debt limit,115 the costs for
failing to act were also high, with critics charging that failure to stem
the tide of filibusters had “come close to destroying the Senate.”116
In the end, Reid had simply “backed down,” allowing what many
Republicans and liberals labeled a win for the Republicans,117 and
allowing the minority to hamper the work of the Senate, and the
President, without even showing up.118 Yet those who put the failure
of reform in 2013 on the individual weaknesses of Harry Reid have
failed to learn from the history of failed efforts at filibuster reform. The
filibuster reform tussle discussed here was only the first in a series of
failed proposals to reform the filibuster in 2013.119 And these other
efforts at reform, including those described above, as well as similar
proposals by the Republicans, also fizzled, leading simply to
agreements to refrain from full exercises of the filibustering power.
In 2013, it was the Senate’s most senior Democrats who resisted
reform, with only the junior senators ultimately pushing for radical
change. This highlights not only the consistent failure of filibuster
reform, but suggests it was the most experienced senators who gave up
114

Id.
See generally Kane, supra note 111 (discussing the series of votes and handshake agreements that constitute the most significant changes to the Senate’s rules in
35 years).
116
George Packer, Senatus Decadens, NEW YORKER DAILY COMMENT (Jan. 4, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/01/senatus-decadens-canfilibuster-reform-save-the-senate.html (blaming “cultural transformation and individual
failure” for the decay of the Senate).
117
Susan Ferrechio, GOP Sees Victory in Senate Deal on Filibuster, WASH. EXAMINER
(Jan. 27, 2013), washingtonexaminer.com/gop-sees-victory-in-senate-deal-on-filibuster/
article/2519764 (describing how Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell wrote to his
supporters in Kentucky: “We beat the liberals.”). Though others argued that the deal
was a loss for everyone. See John Fund, Filibuster Deal ‘Dramatically Alters the Dynamic
of the Senate,’ NAT’L REV.: THE CORNER (Jan. 24, 2013), www.nationalreview.com/
corner/338743/filibuster-deal-dramatically-alters-dynamic-senate-john-fund
(noting
displeasure about the deal among both liberals and conservatives).
118
Michael McAuliff, Tom Harkin: Filibuster Reform Failure Hamstrings Obama
Agenda, HUFF. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/tomharkin-filibuster-reform_n_2544153.html. Harkin went on to argue that President
Obama should consider “a four-year vacation,” as failure to strengthen rules against
filibusters would make it impossible for him to pass ambitious agenda items. Id.
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In July 2013, Harry Reid again threatened to invoke the nuclear option,
expressing anger in graphic terms to Politico over Republicans’ filibustering Obama’s
nominees. See Manu Raju et al., supra note 97. But once again, the threat proved idle,
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the opportunity available to them on the only day of the year, albeit an
extended one, to end the practice. The next section details why.
C. The Majoritarian Paradox: Explaining the Filibuster’s Staying Power
It is important not to infer that idiosyncratic circumstances in each
of the periods of proposed reform described above fully explain the
continuing existence of the filibuster. The failure of numerous Senate
leaders to achieve its reform has been systematic, not circumstantial.
We argue here that this is because its causes are systemic, not ad hoc.
Paradoxically, despite its effect of minoritarian empowerment, the
filibuster is an institution that reflects and protects the institutional
incentives of the majority of senators, which explains why a majority
has not employed the nuclear option or any other serious impediment
to the filibuster’s operation.
The filibuster is just one of the institutionalized practices of the
Senate that springs from a number of norms, previously called the
“folkways,” that are counter-majoritarian, with many not even
enforced by a written rule.120 Many of the folkways have waned in
influence in recent decades, particularly those relating to seniority and
apprenticeship, as discussed below. However, two norms that remain
influential are reciprocity and specialization. One of us (Jacobi)
previously analyzed how reciprocity and specialization explain the
practice that most resembles the filibuster, senatorial courtesy.121 Both
the similarities and differences of the two norms are illustrative in
understanding why the filibuster is respected.
Senatorial courtesy is the informal rule — at times partially
formalized in the blue slip process122 — that is invoked when a
nominee is opposed by the senator from the nominee’s home state.
When this occurs, the Senate will vote down the nomination or never
address it, allowing it to lapse. Senatorial courtesy applies to the
position of federal judge, U.S. attorney, U.S. marshal, and other
offices. This practice, which has operated since the founding and is
typically respected across party lines,123 seems to present a paradox
similar to the filibuster, as it involves senators voluntarily refraining
120

See Donald R. Matthews, The Folkways of the United States Senate: Conformity to
Group Norms and Legislative Effectiveness, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1064, 1064 (1959).
121
Tonja Jacobi, The Senatorial Courtesy Game, 30 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 193, 193 (2005).
122
Senatorial courtesy predates any written rule, and the blue slip rule appears to
exist as a formalization of the norm. See generally Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman,
The Limits of Senatorial Courtesy, 29 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (2004).
123
Id. at 6-9 (finding senatorial courtesy to be statistically significant across party
lines, at least within the first few weeks of the nomination process).
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from exercising their constitutional prerogative to shape advice and
consent nominations. The seeming paradox can be explained by the
persuasive effect of reciprocity and retaliation. If a senator thinks it is
likely that in the future she will have a strong preference over a
nominee from her home state, then she may be willing to forego acting
on a weak preference over a nominee from a different state, in
expectation that other senators will likewise forego asserting their
rights over nominees from her state.124 Similarly, if there is an
expectation that senators will pay each other this courtesy, then
senators who decline to do so are likely to face retaliation when they
attempt to claim senatorial courtesy themselves. With repeated
interactions, each senator expects to be in the majority more often
than to be the lone individual asserting the right of veto. However, if
senators care significantly more about nominations that directly affect
their own state than other states, they will support the dissenting voice
out of an expectation of future reciprocity.125
This explanation for senatorial courtesy resembles the standard
explanation given for the longevity of the filibuster: one day even
majority senators expect to be in the minority. For example, as
Senator John Cornyn observed when filibuster reform again failed in
2013, “The history of this has been that people get up to the edge of
the abyss and they look into the abyss and they pull back because
what majorities realize is that majorities are transient and that today’s
minority can become the majority.”126 This would explain why both
the filibuster and senatorial courtesy apply in the Senate but not the
House: the difference in salience between home state nominees and
other nominees would have to be much greater to sustain in a 435
person body than a 100 person body.127 However, the differences
124
See HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 7 (1972).
Scholars of both Congress and the judiciary agree that nominations affecting their
own constituency are likely to be more salient to the community, and so more
valuable to the senators. Id.; STEVEN S. SMITH, THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 319 (1999);
Jeffrey A. Segal, Charles M. Cameron & Albert D. Cover, A Spatial Model of Roll Call
Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court
Nominations, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 96, 110 (1992).
125
Jacobi, supra note 121, at 194. This is true even under quite adverse conditions,
including when large portions of the Senate support the nominee. Outcomes will
depend on the level of intensity of the greater salience of home state nominations, the
level of discounting of future value in comparison to present value, and the stringency
of the expected retaliatory strategies played for failing to respect the norm. Id. at 201.
126
Humberto Sanchez & Niels Lesniewski, Cornyn Predicts Brokered Compromise
on Filibuster Issue, ROLL CALL (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.rollcall.com/news/
cornyn_predicts_brokered_compromise_on_filibuster_issue-220704-1.html.
127
Jacobi, supra note 121, at 203 (“[A]s the size of the chamber increases,
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between the filibuster and senatorial courtesy are quite telling. This
reciprocity explanation only appears to make sense for locationspecific issues, where greater salience is expected for topics relating to
nominations or other matters affecting a senator’s own state. However,
the filibuster is different from norms such as senatorial courtesy
because it applies to legislation across the board. Nonetheless, as we
show below, the explanation for the filibuster is somewhat reminiscent
of the explanation for senatorial courtesy, although more complex.
Simple logrolling of various salient local interests cannot explain the
filibuster. It is true that the filibuster has been used to protect
localized concerns through logrolling — for instance, western and
southern Democrats joined forces to oppose cloture motions during
the battle in the Senate over civil rights legislation, with the
southerners convincing the westerners that support for cloture in that
situation would undermine future filibusters to protect western
interests.128 However, following three important historical
developments that shaped the composition of the Senate, the filibuster
can no longer be explained through this kind of logrolling.
First, partially in response to the passage of the Civil Rights Act and
partially in response to large geographic movements, significant
numbers of conservative southern Democrats became Republicans
starting in the late 1960s.129 This realignment meant that the
Democratic Party was far less divided in subsequent decades. Second,
in 1994, large numbers of freshman Republicans entered Congress on
the back of the Contract with America, some with promises to limit
themselves in the number of terms they served in Congress. Those
freshman senators were unwilling to follow the norms of seniority and
sustaining an equilibrium where senatorial courtesy is respected requires the absolute
value of the payoffs . . . to increase dramatically relative to the payoffs of the voting
senators. Consequently, all other things being equal, senatorial courtesy and other like
norms become harder to sustain in a large chamber than in a small chamber.”).
128
See ROBERT CARO, THE PASSAGE OF POWER: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON 567
(2012); WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, PHILIP FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY ch. 1 (4th ed. 2007).
129
This change also affected the House. See NELSON POLSBY, HOW CONGRESS
EVOLVES: SOCIAL BASES OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 80-85 (2004) (describing how
northerners settled in the South after the advent of residential air conditioning,
leading to the Dixiecrats being replaced by Republicans and so sharply increasing
partisanship among both Democrats and Republicans). However, for challenges to this
argument see, for example, SEAN TRENDE, THE LOST MAJORITY: WHY THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT IS UP FOR GRABS — AND WHO WILL TAKE IT (2012) (arguing that the white
South began breaking away from the Democrats in the 1920s, for economic rather
than racial issues: Southern whites began voting Republican as their wealth increased,
while the Republican Party was still supporting a civil rights platform).
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apprenticeship, which gave enormous power to long-serving
committee chairs — including many Democrats — and required that
freshman serve their time before gaining any influence, or even before
it was appropriate for them to speak on the floor.130 Instead, these
freshman senators largely abolished the reciprocity-reliant norm of
seniority. Third, campaign finance reform simultaneously restricted
“hard money” raised by candidates from individuals and loosened up
“soft money” raised by political parties,131 significantly strengthening
the influence of the parties over individual candidates. Together, these
three changes paved the way for increases in party discipline, which
undermined the opportunity for logrolling between factions or
individuals over filibusters, and turned the filibuster into a far greater
party-exercised device than ever before.
Consequently, the local salience explanation for senatorial courtesy
would not appear to apply to the filibuster for two reasons. First, the
heightened salience of home state nominations does not apply to
filibusters in the modern context; under that logic, any senator may
have an incentive to exercise such a veto, but there would be no
reason for other senators to respect it. Put another way, there is no
reason to expect greater salience for future bills than present bills,
when the issues they address do not vary systematically by locality.
Second, without localized interests defining the exercise of any veto,
there would be far more potential applications for a general filibuster
than a localized exercise of senatorial courtesy, greatly increasing the
costs of respecting any such veto by other senators. Nonetheless, what
does emerge is an incentive that somewhat resembles the senatorial
courtesy explanation.
The rise of party discipline may mean that there is far less incentive
for logrolling in support of filibusters, however, it has not led to the
decline of the filibuster. Quite the contrary: the rise of party influence
has significantly increased use of the filibuster, to the point of it

130
See Matthews, supra note 120, at 1065. For a modern example of the Senate
freshman-as-firebrand, refusing to kowtow to seniority, see Jonathan Weisman, Texas
Senator Goes on Attack and Raises Bipartisan Hackles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2013, at A1
(describing the very visible and noisy first seven weeks of new senator Ted Cruz of
Texas, including his effort to stymie the nomination of Obama appointee (and former
senator) Chuck Hagel for Secretary of Defense).
131
This describes the incentives created between the time of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), upholding campaign finance
restrictions on individual donors, and its decision in Citizens United v. Fed. Election
Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), prohibiting restriction on expenditure by unions and
corporations.
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becoming a standard part of the procedure on most substantive bills.132
In 2009, “every returning Democratic senator signed a letter
complaining that the Republican routinization of filibusters was
imposing a 60-vote supermajority requirement on nearly all significant
bills.”133
In an era of party discipline, rather than providing a mechanism by
which different minorities respect each other’s rights, the filibuster
simply empowers the minority at the expense of the majority. This
returns us to the standard explanation: that, one day, majorities expect
to be in the minority. But breaking this platitude down shows that
with greater specificity, it can provide more in the way of an
explanation of the filibuster.
For a majority to allow a minority a veto over all legislation, rather
than specific localized interests, simply because they expect to be in
the minority in the future, it would have to be the case that either
senators care more about the future than the present or that senators
care more about what happens to legislation that arises when they are
in the minority than to legislation arising when they are in the
majority. The former explanation is the very definition of irrationality:
standard models of behavior provide for discounting future rewards,
due to their lower certainty and natural human impatience. Any
explanation that rests on senators gaining greater value from future
rewards than present rewards makes little sense. The latter
explanation could make sense under one of two conditions: either
senators are highly risk-averse, or else they truly follow the
Madisonian philosophy that it is better to prevent bad legislation from
passing than to pass good legislation. Arguably, these two are in fact
the same thing: fearing the passage of bad bills more than valuing the
passage of good ones is in essence risk aversion at the policymaking
level. Risk aversion is itself a kind of irrationality, but one that is
common enough to be incorporated into standard models of human
behavior: the utility of an expectation is less than the expectation of a
utility. However for highly educated senators, is this explanation
adequate to capture the strong history of the filibuster? If we consider
more precisely the incentives of senators, we can give greater traction
to both the risk aversion thesis and the salience thesis.
Two classics of political science from the 1970s, written by David
Mayhew134 and Morris Fiorina,135 broke down congressional incentives
132
See Senate Actions on Cloture Motions, supra note 83 (detailing explosion in
filibuster use in past ten Congresses).
133
Noah, Die, Filibuster, Die, supra note 49.
134
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based on the drive for re-election. The electoral incentive causes
Members of Congress to structure its own institutional rules and
policy outcomes. In particular: First, since re-election is based on
individual constituencies, Congressmen have an interest in creating
localized, and so particularized, benefits; the effect is less for the
Senators, who serve whole states, but in essence, the same logic holds.
Second, Congressmen benefit from making noise about issues they
either support or oppose — through “credit claiming,” “advertising,”
“blame shifting,” and “position taking” — but they do not actually
need to achieve much at all.136 The former effect looks like risk
aversion, but rather than resting on individual idiosyncratic
irrationality, it is far more rational because it is promoted by an
institutionalized framework that pushes away from action to actually
achieve goals and toward pure position taking. The latter effect,
promoting particularized benefits, brings us back to the senatorial
courtesy explanation: it means that even though the filibuster operates
across the board, senators are nonetheless still likely to be focused
disproportionately on those issues affecting their own states. Combine
this institutionalized salience with the institutionalized risk aversion
effect, and we expect that senators will be willing to accept a
minoritarian mechanism that prevents much action from taking place
— on the proviso that they can oppose any adverse action directed at
their own constituency. Together, these factors provide the
institutional incentive for the filibuster.
Ironically, it was this set of institutional incentives that created the
budgetary problem that reconciliation was meant to correct, because
every representative had an incentive to seek spending for their
district or state, but nobody really has the incentive to control the
budget.137 This explanation predicts exactly what happened in 2009,
2013, and during the many other attempts at filibuster reform
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MORRIS FIORINA, CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT
(1974).
136
Alford and Brady found support for the predictions of both Fiorina and
Mayhew, which predicted that the rise in constituency services around the 1960s
made members more re-electable. John Alford & David Brady, Personal and Partisan
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(Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 5th ed. 1993).
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Although the rise of the Tea Party, with its emphasis on budgetary restraint,
may appear to be the exception, the initially much-anticipated power of the Tea Party
failed to materialize in the 2012 election. See David Weigel, Why the Tea Party Failed,
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previously described: a lot of talk about reform, raised expectations,
but when it comes down to actually bringing about change, very little
is done.
The reason is not, as some argue, that there is a serious
constitutional impediment to abolishing the filibuster, or that the
Senate has a grand history of being a minority institution — the
former argument is rebutted below and the latter argument has not
been the case since the 1960s, for the reasons described above. Rather,
the reason is that while the majority of the Senate acting as a majority
has the incentive to abolish the filibuster, that majority is made up of
individuals, none of whom possess the institutional incentive to
significantly reform the filibuster rule.138 So it is the majority that
actually creates and maintains minoritarian power. The filibuster looks
like a paradox, but it is really simply a product of institutional
incentives toward particularized benefits and away from positive
action, including institutional reform.
One final factor adds to this setup in favor of the filibuster: the
stickiness of norms. Whether describing the basics of human
evolution or the intricacies of the legal rules, scholars have recognized
that rules of behavior tend, once established, to be difficult to change:
“Norms provide cultural ‘stickiness,’ or viscosity that can help sustain
adaptive behavior and retard detrimental changes in society. . . .
Equally, though, stickiness can inhibit the introduction and spread of
beneficial behaviors . . . .”139 Norm stickiness means that even if these
institutional incentives were not enough to create the filibuster in the
first place — as we have seen, the filibuster evolved over time in spite
of an early expectation that debate would not be overly drawn out and
protracted — nonetheless, once created, it is difficult to abolish. On
top of risk aversion and salience, then, we can add path dependence to
our explanation. In fact, as the next Part shows, the major reform to
the filibuster that has come about, reconciliation, was not heralded or
even intended as a reform.

138
This can include moderates. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport,
The Judicial Filibuster, the Median Senator, & the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 2005
SUP. CT. REV. 257, 272-73 (arguing why moderate senators may prefer supermajority
rules such as the filibuster, as they tend to produce more moderate nominees).
139
PAUL R. EHRLICH & ANNE H. EHRLICH, THE DOMINANT ANIMAL: HUMAN EVOLUTION
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 115 (2008); see Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves:
Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607 (2000) (applying this
concept to the law).
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RECONCILIATION: MAJORITARIAN COUNTER

In contrast to ordinary bills, which are subject to a filibuster that
requires 60 votes to overcome through cloture, debate on
reconciliation bills in the Senate is limited to twenty hours.140 As this
Part makes clear, such stringent restrictions on debate were only
intended to apply to budgetary procedures, but the very fact of their
stringency made them more broadly appealing to avoid the across-theboard de facto supermajority requirement that the institutionalization
of the filibuster had created. We maintain that it is no coincidence that
reconciliation emerged as a majoritarian alternative to the filibuster
during the exact time period when the filibuster became most
prevalent.
Senator Mansfield installed the two-track system just before the
Joint Study Committee on Budget Control was holding its hearings in
1972, from which the reconciliation procedure emerged. Before the
two-track system, filibusters were an annoyance, sometimes a tragic
one in the case of civil rights, but not an everyday occurrence. They
only became a standard fixture after the requirement to actually stand
up and speak disappeared, and the filibuster turned into an option to
place an invisible hold on any bill, removable only through a 60-vote
cloture motion. Reconciliation’s evolution occurred within this very
time frame. While debate on reconciliation bills was limited by statute
from the start, senators (and presidents) did not begin to advocate
using those limits strategically to pass bills by simple majorities until
the time that filibuster usage exploded. Not surprisingly, both the
post-two-track expansion of filibusters and the first attempt to use
reconciliation to pass a tax cut, date to a time of bitter partisan conflict
— the “Republican Revolution” and the Contract With America in the
mid-1990s. By that time, a true supermajority requirement had come
to dominate Senate business, but at the very same time majorities
began to use reconciliation for reasons far outside its original
budgetary purposes. Both structures had drifted far away from their
original uses, at exactly the right time to clash with each other.
A. Origins of Reconciliation
1.

Arising from Conflict

Reconciliation was created during a time of panic on Capitol Hill.
After nearly two centuries of American government, no one was truly
140
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sure by the early 1970s who controlled the government’s budget. The
committee that invited Charles Schultze to present budget reform
proposals received its commission in 1972,141 but reform of the
budgetary procedure had been a long time coming. Deficits, which are
commonplace in congressional budgets today, were an alarming
prospect at the time. The Joint Study Committee on Budget Control
observed that there had been 37 deficit-laden budgets in the 54 years
since 1920, and while there were ten years with surpluses prior to
1931, there were only six after.142 Deficits had recently reached their
highest levels since the New Deal, averaging $20.3 billion for the
previous three years, roughly equivalent by inflation to the trilliondollar-plus deficits of the first Obama Administration.143
Beyond the numbers, however, there was a bigger problem: the
sense that Congress’s hold on the budget was lost. While Congress had
dominated budget making for over a century after the Founding, it
formally ceded authority to the president in 1921, helping lead to the
“imperial presidency” of the 1960s and early 1970s — a reign that
extended to budget control.144 President Nixon had acted in 1972 to
“impound,” or withhold spending of, billions of dollars of funds that
Congress had allocated, a move that “threaten[ed] Congress’s very
existence,” as one senator declared.145 Similarly, the President had
demanded that Congress install a $250 billion ceiling on spending for
1973.146 After the explosive growth of government during the New
Deal, Congress had, for the previous several decades, “developed its
budget in a highly decentralized fashion so that lawmakers and voters
had difficulty both developing an accurate picture of the magnitude of
spending that resulted and controlling individual decisions so that
they accorded with larger spending objectives.”147
Most in Congress had no overall sense of how much the body was
spending as a whole, especially considering “backdoor spending” that
141

See S. REP. NO. 93-17, at 1 (1973).
JOINT STUDY COMM. ON BUDGET CONTROL, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING
CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OVER BUDGETARY OUTLAY AND RECEIPT TOTALS, H.R. REP. NO.
93-147, at 1 (1973) [hereinafter BUDGET STUDY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS].
143
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Senator Charles Mathias, Jr.).
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was not covered in the appropriations process.148 One hand did not
know, or avoided learning, what the other was doing. Congress would
often vote for overall spending decreases, but in the same year increase
outlays for individual programs, “a budgetary swamp from which
there was no easy escape.”149 While congressional appropriations
committees had previously guided the process, they had lost that
power over time to multiple other committees.150 All of these factors,
particularly Nixon’s threat to Congress’s power of the purse, prompted
members to act “[w]ith unusual speed” in reforming budget
procedures in the early 1970s.151
Congress’s first move toward reform, perhaps predictably, was to
form a committee — but it was at the committee level where
reconciliation entered the story. At the same time that it increased the
country’s debt limit in 1972, Congress created the Joint Study
Committee on Budget Control in order to study “procedures which
should be adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving
congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals.”152 The
committee invited Charles L. Schultze and countless others to offer
analysis and ideas. When the committee voted on sending its report to
the full Congress, its members backed it unanimously; their decisive
recommendations were soon hailed.153
The committee made several recommendations that found their way
into the law itself. The law made good on the Joint Study Committee’s
original charge to completely reformulate the budget process. The
legislation established whole new institutions (standing budget
committees and the Congressional Budget Office), a new type of
legislation (the concurrent budget resolution), and a new calendar
148
See Philip G. Joyce, Congressional Budget Reform: The Unanticipated Implications
for Federal Policy Making, 56 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317, 318 (1996).
149
JOHN B. GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES?: CONGRESS, THE BUDGET PROCESS,
AND THE DEFICIT 17 (1990).
150
See WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 67
(8th ed. 2011).
151
Hogan, supra note 6, at 134.
152
Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-599, § 301(b)(1), 86 Stat. 1324, 1325.
153
See, e.g., Eileen Shanahan, A Bid for Rationality: Plan for Congressional Budget
System Could Bring Order out of Fiscal Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1973, at 65 (“If they
are adopted . . . the procedures may well constitute the greatest step toward rational
decision making in the area of economic policy since passage of the Employment Act
of 1946 . . . .”); Editorial, Toward a Legislative Budget, WASH. POST, Apr. 22, 1973, at
B6 (“It is a remarkable drive for reforms, led by some of the most senior and
influential men on Capitol Hill and spurred by a fortuitous mixture of concern over
excessive spending, apprehension for the health of Congress, and challenges from the
President.”).

294

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:261

(shifting the start of the fiscal year to October 1).154 During floor
debate on the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, as it was officially known, Senator Bill Brock summed up the
purpose of the entire law: “We have evolved and created so many
Federal programs of late that it seems that Congress has lost control of
the oversight function. This bill, in a truly conservative sense, is an
effort to re-establish that function.”155 Others were willing to offer
even more fulsome praise, such as Senator Robert Byrd: “[W]hen we
look back some years in the future, many of us may be able to say that
it was among the most important measures acted upon during our
entire service in the Congress.”156
Despite some initial wariness from certain factions in Congress,157
the Budget Act passed the Senate unanimously in May 1974.158
President Nixon’s signature on the Act was among his final acts as
Chief Executive.
2.

Intentions Behind Reconciliation

An allowance for omnibus reconciliation legislation to square
Congress’s spending targets with its policy proposals was an important
part of the budget package in 1974, one that proponents explicitly
called for.159 But it was not the most important element. Some have
even argued that the Act’s framers “viewed reconciliation as
unimportant,” because “it was an optional process for tying the
ceilings enacted in the second concurrent budget resolution (since
eliminated) to the changes in laws governing taxes and spending
(mainly appropriations) necessary to achieve them.”160 Whether or not
that is true, it seems fairly certain that reconciliation was intended to
serve as a player in the backfield of the new budget structure,
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providing defense and protecting the entities at the heart of the action
— the budget committees and their budget resolutions.
Reconciliation’s main role in the overall operation of the Act was to
provide an “enforcement procedure” for the spending limits
established in other parts of the legislation and to ensure that the new
budget resolutions under the law were not “meaningless.”161 Because
the law ultimately called for Congress to adopt two budget resolutions
each year, reconciliation bills were intended to make the advisory
targets in the first budget resolution align with the mandatory rules in
the second.162 Reconciliation was tied to the second resolution,
meaning it “could only be expected, at that late point in the year, as a
last-ditch mechanism to address a problem that had arisen since the
first resolution.”163
As we consider reconciliation today, the defining feature of a
reconciliation bill is its self-imposed limitation on floor debate, the
element that brings reconciliation bills into conflict with the filibuster.
In most matters in the modern Senate, 60 votes are needed to invoke
cloture, or the end of debate. Any one senator can force a bill’s
proponents to find 60 votes for their proposal, as any senator can
threaten to filibuster any matter. But that is not so with reconciliation.
As adopted, the reconciliation law provides that “[d]ebate in the
Senate on any reconciliation bill . . . and all amendments thereto and
debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be
limited to not more than 20 hours.”164 Because debate by definition on
a reconciliation bill is not unlimited, there can be no filibuster to hold
it up. This limitation was not in the original bill, but was added in the
version that emerged from the House Rules Committee and stayed put
thereafter.165
Exactly why the limitation emerged is unclear. Within the entire
2,132-page legislative history of the 1974 Budget Act, there is only one
reference explaining the limitation of 20 hours on debate of
reconciliation bills: “Time allowed for floor debate and amendments
has been reduced to levels that are ample for full discussion of the
contrasting views about the economic and budget issues contained in
161
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the concurrent resolutions.”166 When G. William Hoagland, former
staff director of the Senate Budget Committee, set out to research
whether the Budget Act’s framers were aware that its debate
limitations might clash with the filibuster, he admitted he “found very
few answers.”167
In fact, when the Joint Study Committee filed its final report of
recommendations for reforming the congressional budget process,
reconciliation was not mentioned by name at all. The report did
mention limits on debate, suggesting that each house be limited to 30
hours of talk on either budget resolution that it passes during a fiscal
year, but said nothing of debate on a reconciliation-style bill.168
Discussing the bill on the Senate floor, Senator Byrd, the chamber’s
unofficial dean of procedure, said he had personally analyzed it with
the Parliamentarian to make sure the bill “would not too greatly
disturb the existing methods of doing business in the Senate”169 —
among them, presumably, the Senate’s tradition of unlimited debate.
His only other comment was that the House Rules Committee’s
“principal change regarding procedure” to the 1974 Budget Act was
“the rewriting of the limitation on debate on concurrent resolutions
and the reconciliation bill.”170
There is thus some evidence that senators were aware of the
limitation on debate of reconciliation bills, though they did not much
discuss its purpose or how it interacted with filibuster rules. There is
not much dispute that, in general, the purpose of the limit was
probably “to ease and speed up passage of the budget.”171 Over twenty
years after the adoption of the Budget Act, Representative Lee
Hamilton summed up the reason for this limitation: “[T]he rule, as we
all know, is designed to keep the package intact and not to weaken
it.”172 Yet it is also clear that the legislative history of the Budget Act
suggests zero “congressional intent to create a filibuster-proof way of
166
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pushing through spending increases or tax cuts having nothing to do
with deficit reduction.”173
Therefore, the reconciliation procedure emerged from the successful
budget overhaul of the early 1970s as an option, though not
necessarily a prominent one, for helping Congress stay within its selfimposed spending limits. Though the Budget Act was “born in
conflict” between the president and Congress over budget
procedure,174 its provisions, including reconciliation, won wide
acceptance on Capitol Hill. If its proponents foresaw a peaceful era for
the foreseeable future, it was because they failed to consider how the
limits on debate in a reconciliation bill might affect strategic thinking
vis-à-vis the filibuster — and cause further conflict — in Congress for
years to come.
B. How Reconciliation Works
Reconciliation bills typically have only one chance to appear each
year, as they are a product of a budget process that Congress tends to
go through just once annually. That process has several basic steps,
starting with the requirement that the president send Congress a
budget proposal by February.175 After that, the budget committees put
together a resolution that sets spending targets for the budget.176
Should the budget resolution require changes in existing statutes to
meet spending goals — and it often does — the resolution will include
reconciliation instructions.177 Those instructions will identify the
committee in question, outline the budgetary changes that Congress
wants to make within the committee’s policy jurisdiction, the fiscal
years during which the changes are to occur, and a deadline for the
committee to submit its own recommendations.178
Once the budget committees pass their resolutions, the nonbudgetary congressional committees approve bills that meet resolution
spending targets; the individual bills are then cobbled together in an
omnibus reconciliation bill.179 Sometimes, Congress short-circuits this
173
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process by not passing a budget resolution at all. This occurred in
1998, 2002, 2004, and 2006,180 meaning that no reconciliation bills
were possible in those years. (Reconciliation cannot reconcile
individual bills with the budget resolution if there is no resolution.)
Otherwise, the reconciliation bill eventually lands before each house
of Congress. In the Senate, the bill must be taken up without delay, as
a reconciliation bill is considered privileged and no senator can hold
up a motion to proceed to consider it.181
By law, as discussed above, debate on reconciliation bills in the
Senate is limited to 20 hours, or exactly 12 minutes per senator. This
provision is crucial, as it leaves no possibility for a long-winded
filibuster, or the threat of one, to delay Senate business. In practice,
the 20 hours are divided evenly between the parties.182
While actual debate on the substance of a reconciliation bill is
obviously limited, there is still the potential for senators to drag out
overall consideration of the legislation indefinitely. They may do so by
offering a theoretically endless string of amendments to the bill, in a
tactic that has become known as the “Vote-a-Rama.” Its conception is
somewhat ingenious in its adherence to the letter of the law. While the
text of the reconciliation statute indicates that debate on “all
amendments” to a reconciliation bill must fall within the twenty-hour
limit,183 the text does not say that all voting on the bill must occur
within the same timeframe, nor does it limit the number of potential
amendments. Senators, therefore, will occasionally attack a
reconciliation bill through proposing amendment after amendment in
hopes of killing the bill. While the Senate usually allows only a minute
per side to explain and defend such amendments, they can go on
indefinitely — a procedural spectacle that some have described as
“unseemly” and “egregious.”184 Yet others have defended the practice
as “a way to protect the rights of the minority” in the Senate.185 A
Vote-a-Rama was deployed against the health care reform
reconciliation bill in 2010, but it was ultimately unsuccessful at
derailing the bill.186 Perhaps that is because senators employing the
180
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Vote-a-Rama — unlike those who “filibuster” all manner of legislation
today — must actually stand up and speak in order to effectuate
obstruction.
Other than the Byrd Rule, discussed below, the Vote-a-Rama is the
most significant limitation on how reconciliation operates — which is
to say that there are few significant limitations on the process. How
does this fit with our institutional incentives explanation, described
above? If there is a strong incentive toward protecting minoritarian
interests, created by particularism, risk aversion, and path
dependence, why did the Senate allow for the creation of the
reconciliation process? And once created, why was reconciliation
used; why did the same institutional norms not push away from
exploiting it? In fact, initially, reconciliation was rarely used to its full
potential, and only gradually became a powerful weapon for
reassertion of majority power, as the next Part makes clear.
III. MAJORITARIANISM ASCENDANT?
The strategic implications of using reconciliation to maximize its
immunity from the filibuster appeared to dawn only slowly on
senators. In December 1975, the Senate considered a reconciliation
bill, and the rules for debate were still obscure enough that no less a
figure than Senator Russell Long, chairman of the Senate finance
committee, had to ask what they were. “Mr. President, how much time
does the law spell out, how the time is to be divided?” he asked.187 (He
received the correct answer, but the bill failed.)
For the first several years of its existence, reconciliation sat mostly
dormant as Congress attempted to try out its new budgetary
procedures. Though potentially powerful, reconciliation remained
only a “paper tiger” during the 1970s,188 a procedure “hardly
discussed, let alone attempted.”189 Among the reasons was the
following: Members of Congress were wary of alienating the
committees that had previously handled the budget in piecemeal
fashion, tempting defeat of a reconciliation bill.190 In 1977, for
example, the Senate Budget Committee bowed to Senate farm interests
187
121 CONG. REC. 40540 (1975). Senator Long recovered a few minutes later in
response to another clarifying question from Senator Carl Curtis, remembering the
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who wished to keep $700 million worth of crop support in violation of
a tight-fisted budget resolution; the reconciliation instructions
ordering the $700 million cut were deleted.191
It was not until 1980 that reconciliation was first successfully used
to pass a budget, but Congress has passed a reconciliation bill in most
years since.192 By the 1990s and 2000s, Members of Congress had
come to recognize the strategic value of bootstrapping their legislative
priorities to an omnibus reconciliation bill free from the leisurely
deliberation for which the Senate is known. In 2001, the same Senator
Byrd who was so effusive in his praise for the Budget Act in 1974
lamented, “[H]ow far we have wandered from the course originally
conceived by the Congress as the reconciliation process,” alleging that
“the misuse has been gross,” and that reconciliation bills “have proven
to be almost irresistible vehicles for Senators to use to move all
manner of legislation because of these fast-track procedures.”193
Yet there was never anything to stop them from doing so initially.
The law establishing reconciliation has changed little since its
adoption, including its limitation on debate of reconciliation bills.
What has changed, however, is senators’ thinking about how to use
the procedure. As the specter of the filibuster loomed larger over the
Senate during the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, growing into a “de facto
minority-party veto” requiring 60 votes on most legislation,194 the
limited-debate rules of reconciliation grew more attractive as a way to
avoid the filibuster’s supermajority requirement.
A. Reagan-Era Reconciliation
Before the presidency of Ronald Reagan, reconciliation had almost
no potential to become a strategic device. But by the time Reagan had
left office, not only had the rules reflecting reconciliation changed, but
the use of the procedure to get things done in Congress had
transformed as well. Reagan’s broad vision for reviving the economy
required a device that could allow senators to push through
contentious legislation without necessarily acquiring 60 votes. During
his presidency, conditions shifted to allow reconciliation to be that
device, setting the stage for later conflicts.
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Changing the Rules

The structural change that was necessary for reconciliation to begin
its transition away from its status as a budgetary backstop was
Congress’s decision in 1980 to abandon the idea of producing two
budget resolutions each year. Reconciliation, as noted above, was
originally intended to square the targets called for in the year’s first
budget resolution in the spring, which was advisory, with those
monies requested in the second budget resolution, which was
binding.195 But this structure was causing a problem; it left Congress
just 10 days after the second resolution to put together and pass a
reconciliation bill, discouraging Members of Congress from using it.196
In passing the Budget Act of 1974, Congress included what came to
be known as an “elastic clause,” permitting itself to “set forth such
other matters, and require such other procedures, relating to the
budget, as may be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act.”197
This clause would prove crucial to promoting the use of
reconciliation. Democrats on the House Budget Committee in 1980
moved aggressively to transfer reconciliation to the spring
resolution,198 thus allowing reconciliation instructions to attach
initially to measures, rather than as a response in the second budget
resolution. Despite some protest, this move “profoundly altered” the
budget process.199 Suddenly, a reconciliation bill seemed achievable,
because there was so much more time to put one together. While the
change may have “reduce[d] procedural flexibility” in doing away
with the second budget resolution each year,200 it brought strategic
value to reconciliation in a previously unanticipated fashion.
2.

Harnessing the Change

President Reagan and the Republicans “exploited most thoroughly”
the change in rules in 1981, shortly after Reagan took office.201 His
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plan: $100 billion worth of spending reductions over three years.202
Putting his proposal, which included the largest tax cut in history,
into place would require short-circuiting the separation-of-powers
intentions of the 1974 Budget Act, which was intended to empower
Congress to take back control of the budget process. Luckily, he had
willing allies in congressional Republicans, who agreed that the best
way to implement such a large package of cuts was a “‘quick, up-front
reconciliation’ measure that would short-cut the usual long legislative
route.”203
While passing all of the measures Reagan’s aides wanted would
normally require at least a dozen separate bills,204 reconciliation
allowed them to do so with just two votes: the first on the budget
resolution, and the second on the reconciliation bill. The strategy
worked. The Republicans held a majority in the Senate, and the House
Republicans were able to convince enough “boll weevil Democrats” to
win easy passage of the bill — a feat that would have been nearly
impossible under the old multi-committee-based system of budget
process.205
The success of Reagan’s gambit produced much soul-searching,
including hemming and hawing over separation-of-powers questions
of whether the episode had transferred budget power back to an
administration that was “arrogantly trying to impose their will on
Congress.”206 Reaction from Democrats in opposition, the first
individuals to discover the strategic power of reconciliation, was swift
and unkind. Representative Gillis W. Long called reconciliation “an
extremely dangerous situation.”207 Senator Richard Bolling went
further, decrying the “exploitation of the reconciliation process,
coupled with draconian Republican Party discipline,” which “enabled
the executive to unilaterally impose its will” and represented “a potent
recipe for despotism.”208
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Fair or not, it is clear that the sudden success of reconciliation to
enact a large package of spending changes was unprecedented.209 Soon
after the conclusion of this first successful reconciliation episode,
reconciliation expert Allen Schick made a prophetic prediction: “If
reconciliation takes root on Capitol Hill, Congress might become a
very different institution from what it has been for many years . . . .
Reconciliation would redistribute legislative power, giving some
participants more influence over outcomes while diminishing the role
of others.”210 While Schick could not identify exactly how Congress
would change, his prophecy turned out to be spot on.
Reconciliation was eventually exploited, raising the question of why
there was the incentive to exploit it if local salience, risk aversion, and
path dependence lead away from suppressing minority power. The
difference is that while the inertia of existing norms may prevent an
adequate incentive from arising to reform rules such as the filibuster,
it is less costly to exploit a rule that is already in existence. In
particular, stickiness of norms does not arise once a rule has already
been crafted, but there is also less of a problem of risk aversion.
Because use of reconciliation came on gradually, it was unclear that
failure to use it would be reciprocated in the same way as exercise of a
norm such as senatorial courtesy or the filibuster. The Reaganites, for
example, no doubt thought the reconciliation process could only be
used in one direction, in line with their political philosophy of cutting
spending. This suggests that, unlike senatorial courtesy, salience alone
is not enough when applied to an across-the-board rule such as the
filibuster; stickiness and risk aversion play an important part.
So the story reconciliation suggests is that the institutional structure
of the Senate does not prevent majoritarian reforms per se, it only
makes them difficult to pass; once the door is opened, the majority
will take advantage of them. However, the next stage in the story of
the filibuster and reconciliation displays the power of reciprocity.
Reconciliation was to, in fact, cut both ways — for and against
spending. This created pressure not only to simply allow the filibuster
to go unchecked, but to actually push back against reconciliation and
the majoritarian direction that reconciliation represents.
B. Minoritarian Resurgence: Adoption of the Byrd Rule
After the successful (and repeated) use of large reconciliation bills
during the first half of the Reagan Administration, it became obvious
209
210
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that reconciliation was becoming an “attractive vehicle[ ] for the
inclusion by certain committees of provisions of particular interest to
the majority of that committee.”211 There was little senators could do
to block the inclusion of such provisions even when they did not
appear to be germane to budgetary matters. This issue arose quickly
after the first use of reconciliation in the early 1980s, as reconciliation
soon began being used for non-budgetary purposes.
In 1983, for example, reconciliation legislation reduced the number
of Federal Communications Commission members and reduced the
terms of Interstate Commerce Commission members.212 The
temptation to bootstrap programs with little relation to fiscal
discipline to reconciliation bills started to become “enormous”213 and
had “escalated to the point where it now dominate[d] the entire
reconciliation process.”214 The minority response was the development
in 1985 of a special point of order to eliminate such measures. The socalled “Byrd Rule” introduced an important check on the sprawl of
reconciliation outside deficit reduction matters. But it was not a
perfect solution.
The Byrd Rule started not as a rule at all, but as an amendment. The
floor debate on the 1985 reconciliation bill had been particularly
weighted down with amendments that could not have normally been
offered because they would have been filibustered.215 But because no
one could filibuster anything associated with a reconciliation bill, the
amendments flowed forth unchecked. In response, Senator Robert
Byrd offered Amendment no. 878 during a floor debate on the 1985
reconciliation legislation. It provided that any “extraneous”
amendment “shall be deemed stricken from the bill.”216 In presenting
his amendment, Byrd reported that he had counted 122 extraneous
items in the reconciliation bill under discussion — and that the
Senate’s newfound habit of offering such items was nothing short of
the opening of “Pandora’s box.” “It was never foreseen that the Budget
211
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Reform Act would be used in that way,” Byrd said.217 His forceful
critique appeared to win the day:
Mr. President, the Senate is a deliberative body, and the
reconciliation process is not a deliberative process. . . . Such an
extraordinary process, if abused, could destroy the Senate’s
deliberative nature. . . . The Senate must protect itself from
this attack by its own committees, and, if necessary, the
reconciliation bill will be amended to the extent necessary to
achieve a preponderance of nonreconciliation matters and thus
return this bill to a nonprivileged status.218
Byrd’s amendment was adopted — but why? It can surely be posited
that no senator enjoys a filibuster threat except the one making it; one
might therefore ordinarily expect that most senators would favor using
reconciliation to avoid the filibuster and further their legislative goals,
especially “extraneous” ones. But as we have seen, there are
institutional incentives toward minoritarianism and away from
majoritarian pressures in the Senate. The rise of the Byrd Rule to
check the primary limit of the filibuster, reconciliation, comports with
our expectations stemming from the institutional incentives of
senators.
Nonetheless, Byrd did his best to overcome his fellow senators’
qualms by minimizing the purported impact of his rule. When Byrd
proposed the new rule, his fellow senators asked him whether his
amendment would affect the current reconciliation bill, or only future
ones; only future ones, and only those not already in a bill, he said.
They also asked whether the amendment would change any of the
standing rules of the Senate itself; no, he said, only reconciliation
rules. And how would he define extraneous? He replied that the word
applied only to those amendments that did not “contribute[ ] to
reducing the deficit and balancing the budget.”219 After Senator Byrd
had addressed these concerns, the amendment passed by far more
than a majority. The vote was 96–0.220
Byrd’s new rule was not intended to last forever. It was set to expire
on January 2, 1987, in less than a year.221 The following year, it was
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extended for another year, then for five more.222 By 1990, senators
were already calling it “the Byrd Rule,”223 and along with the House,
they ended the ritual of yearly extensions and added it to the law
governing Congress’s budgetary procedure, albeit in a greatly
expanded form.
Codified at 2 U.S.C. § 644, the Byrd Rule considers any provision
within a reconciliation bill extraneous if it “does not produce a change
in outlays or revenues.”224 Even if a provision does change outlays or
revenues, it is still extraneous if it causes a committee to disobey its
reconciliation instructions, if its subject matter is not in that
committee’s jurisdiction, or if the budget change it produces is
“merely incidental.”225 Finally, the Byrd Rule allows senators to strike
a provision that increases net outlays, or decreases revenues, so long as
the changes “are greater than outlay reductions or revenue increases
resulting from other provisions in such title in such year.”226 And it
allows them to do so in a piecemeal fashion, not unlike a line-item
veto; senators can use it to “excise specific language and leave the rest
of the bill or amendment to go along its merry way.”227
Senators have used the Byrd Rule willingly. Of the 18 reconciliation
bills considered between 1985, when the Byrd Rule took effect, and
2010, 14 featured invocations of the rule.228 During this period, 65
Byrd Rule points of order were offered, and 55 were successful, most
often for the reason that the challenged matter did not change outlays
or revenues.229 And there have likely been many more instances in
which the Byrd Rule had an effect on blocking extraneous additions to
reconciliation bills, as it has often convinced senators not to offer such
additions.230
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222
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Limitations on the Byrd Rule

Opinion on the rule is generally positive, if not universally so. Not
surprisingly, Senator Byrd offered praise, considering it “one of the
most effective” measures taken to curtail strategic use of reconciliation
for non-budgetary purposes.231 Others justify the rule as “a critical
protection” for the Senate minority, which is otherwise hamstrung by
reconciliation’s cancellation of the filibuster.232 But the Byrd Rule is
not necessarily as powerful as it might at first seem.
Byrd’s rule is not self-enforcing. It relies upon the adversarial nature
of Senate debate to take effect. The rule permits an individual senator
to enforce its dictates by raising a point of order against any
extraneous part or parts of a reconciliation bill.233 However, the point
of order does not have the immediate effect of nullifying an extraneous
provision; the judge of extraneity is the presiding officer of the Senate.
And that officer relies upon the Senate Parliamentarian for assistance
and reflects the Parliamentarian’s views in his or her ruling.234 If the
presiding officer, after the ruling of the Parliamentarian, upholds the
point of order against the extraneous provision, the decision cannot be
overridden without the votes of three fifths of the Senate235 — the
same number required to defeat a filibuster.
The definition of “extraneous” is not easy to parse. It “can be
complex, ambiguous, and often depends on controversial rulings from
the Chair [of Proceedings].”236 In 1993, for example, senators
challenged the table of contents of a reconciliation bill, pointing out
that they did not relate to the deficit-cutting mission of reconciliation
— a point of order the Parliamentarian helpfully rejected.237
Furthermore, the dependence of those rulings from the Chair of
Proceedings upon the opinion of the Parliamentarian presents other
problems. Most plainly, there is the possibility that the
Parliamentarian is simply wrong, or not objective; his or her rulings
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can change up until the “moment an issue is considered on the Senate
floor.”238 One former budget committee staff director has complained
that the Parliamentarian’s “interpretation of the Byrd Rule would
change, depending on what the issue was.”239 The Parliamentarian is
not required to evaluate opposing points of view.240 In addition, the
Parliamentarian must occasionally consult the Senate Budget
Committee to provide a determination of budget levels, which can
produce varying answers.241 Finally, as discussed below,242 the
majority party has the ability to fire the Parliamentarian, which would
seem to add further uncertainty to the Byrd Rule process.
There are also ways around the Byrd Rule. For example, in 1987, the
budget resolution for the next fiscal year simply declared within its
reconciliation instructions that the inclusion of a Deficit Reduction
Account within the bill was not “extraneous.”243 A more effective way
to avoid Byrd Rule violations, however, is to add “sunset” or
expiration rules to provisions that would otherwise violate the rule,
meaning that the provisions do not permanently decrease revenues. As
discussed in the next section, the Byrd Rule prompted proponents of
President George W. Bush’s tax cuts to include these sunset rules,
allowing them to escape its mandate despite lowering revenues. In
sum, then, the Byrd Rule’s intentions might be described as noble, and
its use frequent, but like most legislative devices, it contains loopholes
and can be defeated.
C. The Bush Tax Cuts
While Ronald Reagan’s reconciliation-backed victory over
Democrats in 1981 represented a change in the strategic deployment
of reconciliation, the resulting legislation still aligned with the goal of
the original 1974 Budget Act: deficit reduction. But during the
presidency of George W. Bush, there was a still larger change in how
senators used reconciliation to their strategic advantage. For the first
quarter-century of its existence, reconciliation was used exclusively
238
Donald B. Tobin, Less Is More: A Move Toward Sanity in the Budget Process, 16
ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 115, 134 (1996) (“Thus a member may believe that a specific
provision is valid under the Budget Act, but find out later that the Parliamentarian
changed his mind and advised the Chair that the provision violated the Act.”).
239
See David Baumann, The Octopus that Might Eat Congress, NAT’L J., May 14,
2005.
240
Tobin, supra note 238, at 133-34.
241
See Yin, supra note 234, at 221-22.
242
See discussion infra Part III.C.
243
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for deficit control,244 but during the Bush presidency, Members of
Congress determined they could also use it in ways that increased the
deficit — namely through large tax cuts.
Republicans had tried a similar idea before, in efforts to enact the
Contract With America during the Clinton Administration, but failed.
The congressional leadership in 1995 passed a massive reconciliation
bill containing $894 billion in deficit cuts and $245 billion in tax cuts,
only to watch its fate get tied up in the infamous government
shutdown standoff of that year, ending with Clinton’s veto.245 That
episode represented the first attempt to employ reconciliation to such
massive, deficit-increasing effect. Just two years earlier, during the
debate over Clinton’s contentious stimulus bill, “no one envisioned
reconciliation to facilitate fiscal bills unrelated to deficit control.”246
Upon taking office, however, President Bush faced a budget
situation unlike those of previous reconciliation battles, as it was in
surplus. Before even taking the oath of office, Bush’s team proposed an
idea for using the surplus in the form of a $1.3 trillion tax cut, the
largest ever attempted.247 While the presence of the surplus provided
some pressure for Democrats to go along with Bush’s proposal,248 the
party composition of the Senate was not in Bush’s favor. It was cleanly
divided, with fifty Democrats and fifty Republicans. Without a 60senator supermajority, or at least 60 friendly votes, Bush’s forces
would have no ability to invoke cloture and overcome the filibuster
threat that Democrats would surely mount against his tax cut plan.
Enter reconciliation. In the two years prior to Bush’s first term in
office, two separate tax cuts had been included in reconciliation bills.
Yet in order to circumvent the Byrd Rule, which prevents the inclusion
of provisions that decrease revenues in a reconciliation bill, both of
the tax cuts were “sunsetted,” or limited in life to the period covered
by the reconciliation instructions.249 These laws provided a playbook
for Bush, who also sunsetted his 2001 tax cut to gain Byrd Rule
compliance.250 However, he also sought to do something different than
any other tax cut passed under reconciliation: he did not offer
244
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corresponding spending reductions that offset the revenue decreases
from the tax cuts. This notion, and the idea in general of using
reconciliation, originally a deficit-control device, to pass tax cuts,
upset Democrats.
Nevertheless, the Republicans’ gambit was successful. Senator Byrd
took the floor to mount a vigorous defense of the original purposes of
the reconciliation process as antithetical to increasing the deficit
through tax cuts.251 His statements appeared to convince the Senate
Parliamentarian that reconciliation instructions could not be used for
a tax cut.252 But rumors of the Parliamentarian’s upcoming ruling
prompted a strategic procedural maneuver. The rumors convinced the
Republican leadership to offer reconciliation instructions not as part of
the original bill, but as an amendment at the last minute, removing
reconciliation from the limelight until just before senators were to
vote on the bill.253 Republicans still expected the move to touch off a
“parliamentary showdown”254 — just perhaps not as large of a
showdown as would be inevitable were reconciliation attached to the
bill from the start.
Senator Byrd again objected, mounting a dramatic speech in which
he compared the Republicans to Augustus abusing the senators of
Rome and to King George III.255 He declared that reconciliation was
originally intended to be “neutral in its purpose,” but that use of
reconciliation’s limited-debate procedures to pass tax cuts was forcing
the people of the United States to “relinquish the right of
representation in the legislature.”256 But he did not formally object.
Byrd clearly seemed to recognize that the tax cut debate had the
potential to formally transform reconciliation into a majoritarian
weapon, and it was, ironically, for that reason that he did not actually
raise a point of order under his own eponymous rule labeling the tax
cuts “extraneous.” As noted earlier, Byrd Rule points of order must be
251
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sustained by the Chair of the Proceedings;257 the Chair’s rulings, once
made, can only be overridden by a three-fifths majority.258 Yet Byrd’s
party was in the minority, and surely could not muster enough votes
to override an expected ruling from the majority Chair against a Byrd
Rule point of order, and so Byrd stood down. He did not want a losing
vote to set a “precedent of the highest order” firmly establishing
reconciliation as a vehicle for tax cuts, so he did not force one.259 His
party concurred, with members announcing after a caucus meeting
that they would not engage in “a bunch of procedural tit-for-tat” with
the Republicans.260
Without a Byrd Rule objection, the reconciliation instructions were
then passed on a party-line vote, enabling the tax cuts to pass the full
Senate with a simple majority, free from the 60-vote requirement to
overcome an otherwise sure filibuster.261 Though the tax cut acquired
reconciliation-bill status on a razor’s edge, its passage appeared to
mark a new precedent: if maneuvers like sunsetting and procedural
wrangling are employed, reconciliation can empower majorities to
evade filibusters and pass nearly any proposal that spends or saves
money, despite whatever reconciliation was originally intended to do
in 1974. Republicans used reconciliation to pass tax cuts again in 2003
and 2005.
There was one casualty to the 2001 tax cut episode: the Senate
Parliamentarian. Robert Dove, a 36-year Senate employee who had
intimated he would rule against using reconciliation instructions for
tax cuts, was fired. Although the Senate Parliamentarian has been
referred to as an “umpire or referee,” making neutral calls on rules
questions, that supposedly innocuous role was not enough to save
Dove’s job.262 The overarching reason given for his firing was that
“[h]e has made it hard for the leadership to plot a strategy”263 — a
strategy that hinged on a favorable application of reconciliation for
political gain. The Parliamentarian’s sacking was further
257
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demonstration that reconciliation had become crucial for the ability of
majorities to assert themselves over otherwise strong minorities in the
Senate. It also showed that, in anything but the short term, there was
now essentially no supervision over the implementation of
reconciliation. The Parliamentarian could rule against the majority’s
desire to use reconciliation, but the majority could use procedural
maneuvers to get around his rulings, or simply fire him outright.264 A
precedent had been set.
D. Obamacare
The Bush Administration tax cuts proved that reconciliation was
more flexible at accommodating the desires of majorities than
previously anticipated. That notion received its final confirmation
during the first two years of President Obama’s Administration. It was
then that the same Democrats who cried foul over reconciliation as a
tax cut vehicle turned around to use it themselves to ensure the
operation and effectiveness of Obama’s health care reform program.
The successful campaign to make Obamacare possible through
reconciliation confirmed what now seems inevitable in hindsight: that
reconciliation had become the de facto legislative strategy for avoiding
the filibuster’s 60-vote supermajority requirement.
It is a common misconception that the entire range of proposals
commonly labeled Obamacare passed via reconciliation.265 However,
just hours after the original Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) became law,
the Senate began its floor work on a second bill, the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.266 That bill, as its title suggests,
was a reconciliation bill — and its importance was such that, as some
commentators have argued, “[r]econciliation enabled the overhaul of
the health care system.”267
264
See discussion infra Part IV.C (discussing the other Parliamentarians who have
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265
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The year 2010 did not represent the first instance of reconciliation
assisting the passage of a health care measure. In fact, every
reconciliation bill from 1980 through 1994 included health care
provisions, and 40 of 66 health policy attachments to omnibus bills
during a similar period arose via reconciliation.268 At the start of the
Obamacare push, Senate leaders contemplated using reconciliation to
pass the entire measure, prompting grumbling from the minority
party.269 It was widely acknowledged, and thus glaringly obvious to
Democrats, that “Republicans’ best hopes of killing health reform rest
on the use of a filibuster in the Senate.”270 But the reconciliation-only
strategy was eventually scuttled as unnecessary, given Democrats’ 60seat (and theoretically filibuster-proof) majority — an advantage that
was instantly dashed with the 2010 election of Republican Scott
Brown into the seat vacated by the death of Democrat Senator Ted
Kennedy. Brown’s victory “stunned the president and congressional
Democrats, upended their plan to move expeditiously to get health
care reform signed into law, and revived GOP hopes that they could
kill the legislation.”271
Yet that hope to kill the bill brought reconciliation back into the
picture. Brown’s victory instead prompted the Democratic leadership
of the Senate to undertake a “dual-bill strategy,” wherein they would
urge the House to pass the Senate bill that had already ascended from
that chamber earlier in the year, and then institute alterations in a
second bill that would soothe House Democrats upset over measures
in the initial bill.272 The announcement of Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid was crystal clear in confirming that reconciliation would
be used explicitly as an end run around obstruction (suggesting it is
easy to underestimate the impact of reconciliation if only looking to its
actual use). Reid cited the fact that the Republican caucus had
“conspicuously shattered the record for obstruction last Congress” in
indicating he would go forward with reconciliation for amending the

capretta (arguing that “[w]ithout reconciliation, Obamacare would not have become law
at all” (emphasis in original)).
268
KRUTZ, supra note 175, at 107-08.
269
“It stinks,” said Senator John Cornyn of Texas. Carl Hulse, A Fight for the Right
to Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2009, at A17.
270
Thomas E. Mann et al., Reconciling with the Past, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at
WK12.
271
Mark J. Oleszek & Walter J. Oleszek, Legislative Sausage-Making: Health Care
Reform in the 111th Congress, in PARTY AND PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
253, 274 (Jacob R. Straus ed., 2012).
272
Id. at 274-75.

314

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:261

health care bill, a move he avowed was not “unusual or extraordinary”
in any way.273
The amendments bill that ended up succeeding through
reconciliation made several changes, though it can be argued that
“[t]he substantive importance of the reconciliation addendum pales in
comparison to its procedural significance.”274 The amendments
addressed concerns of Members of the House who were not pleased
about passing the original Senate bill, while at the same time making
“the end result better than either the Senate or the House bill.”275 They
included:
[P]has[ing] out the Medicare prescription drug plan
“doughnut hole” gap, rais[ing] the penalties for employers not
providing health coverage, modif[ying] the penalties for U.S.
residents failing to obtain insurance, speed[ing] up enactment
of restrictions barring insurance companies from denying
coverage because of preexisting conditions, and clarif[ying]
the requirement that insurers allow adult children to remain
on parents’ policies until age 26.276
Republicans, however, still entertained hopes of defeating the bill,
though not through a filibuster, which would not have been allowed
under reconciliation rules. Instead, they turned to Byrd Rule
challenges. Republicans believed “a Byrd [R]ule violation that went to
the heart of the bill could bring the bill down entirely,”277 and they
were probably right — yet they were unable to successfully convince
the Parliamentarian that one existed. Republicans rested their hopes
on the argument that a provision in the bill relating to an excise tax on
“Cadillac” (or really expensive) insurance plans violated 2 U.S.C.
273
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§ 641(g), which disallows through the Byrd Rule any reconciliation
bill that makes changes to Social Security.278 The Parliamentarian,
Alan Frumin, disagreed, essentially sinking Republican hopes to beat
back the bill.279 Such challenges would never have been necessary
under a filibuster-only regime. Indeed, the Parliamentarian would not
need to be consulted, and the bill likely would have never come to the
floor, as the implied threat of a filibuster would have kept it away. But
under reconciliation, the bill passed, 56–40.
Reconciliation allowed a simple majority to have its way on the most
important legislative item of President Obama’s first-term agenda: “In
the end, it was the budget process that made enactment of the health
care reform bill possible.”280 Republicans would have surely
filibustered the reconciliation bill if they could have and after Scott
Brown’s election, they had the numbers to do so. But reconciliation,
born as a small part of the 1974 budget reform movement got in the
way. As the events surrounding Obamacare showed, Senators’
thinking about how to use it had altered drastically in the ensuing four
decades.
IV. THE FUTURE OF LEGISLATION: MAJORITARIANISM OR
MINORITARIANISM
Even without filibuster reform, arguments are being made that, with
reconciliation ascendant as an alternative to the filibuster, “Congress
has become a majoritarian body, to a degree virtually unprecedented
in modern times.”281 However, the filibuster is typically an
“unbreakable” tactic,282 requiring a supermajority of sixty votes to
defeat it. Reconciliation has therefore increasingly been used when
possible to cobble together controversial legislation that “would have
provoked filibusters had they been possible, and quite likely these
filibusters would have been successful.”283 In that sense, the two
procedures, reconciliation and the filibuster, are now joined at the hip.
For example, in the run-up to the 2012 presidential election, it was
assumed in the political press that a potential President Mitt Romney
278
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would have to push Congress to use reconciliation widely if he hoped
to avoid filibusters getting in the way of majority votes on his
agenda.284 And it was already being argued in early 2013 that
reconciliation could become more common in future budget debates
as a result of the tax compromise between President Obama and
Senate Republicans on the “fiscal cliff.”285 As the healthcare legislation
passage shows, the effect of this device is not limited to financial
matters. Rather, much controversial modern legislation creation is
likely to hinge on the reconciliation process, which has evolved into a
clear if limited majoritarian alternative to the filibuster.286
Reconciliation’s evolution has produced a chorus of critics. Chief
among them before his death was Senator Byrd, himself, one of the
architects of the original 1974 Budget Act, who pleaded with his
colleagues from the Senate floor to use reconciliation, the “bear trap,”
only “sparingly” and “for purposes of fiscal restraint.”287 The outcry
from opponents of the health care reconciliation bill was similar. The
general complaint was that reconciliation’s empowerment of majorities
“substantially diminish[es] the procedural rights normally enjoyed by
senators.”288 That phrase, “procedural rights,” refers of course to the
right of a Senate minority to filibuster a bill.
The clash between reconciliation and the filibuster is likely to
continue, and heighten. The reconciliation episodes of the 2000s and
2010s have shown that the procedure’s potential use to spend or save
284
See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, November 7th, N.Y. MAG, Oct. 14, 2012 (citing
speculations that a President Romney would use reconciliation to pass his budget
plan); Major Garrett, Smooth Mitt, NATIONALJOURNAL.COM (Oct. 18, 2012, 12:15 PM),
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government funds is vast, provided that its proponents are able to skirt
around the Byrd Rule — not always a difficult task.
Reconciliation’s ascendance to the forefront of Senate strategy marks
a chance for majorities to reassert themselves on major legislation. It
also marks a fascinating chapter in the evolution of congressional
procedure as an obscure budgetary device retrofitted as a weapon for
majoritarian (and often partisan) action. The filibuster, too, has
changed from the days of a more genteel Senate, to the point where
actual filibusters no longer occur. But filibusters remain quite real in
their effect, and even if filibuster reform is eventually successful, the
Senate’s interest in its long-held tradition of unlimited debate is likely
to remain strong. That idea will make reconciliation all the more
important as legislators and presidents decide what legislation they
truly cannot live without — or at least that for which they cannot
muster sixty votes.
A. The Constitutionality of Filibuster Reform and Reconciliation
There is a lively debate over whether the filibuster’s minoritarian
obstruction can or should be challenged in the courts as an
unconstitutional procedure of the Senate.289 On the flip side, there is a
similar debate over whether reform of the filibuster, particularly when
exercised by a simple majority, would be an unconstitutional intrusion
on the rights of a minority of senators. Similar sentiments have been
raised in regard to the exercise of reconciliation.290 None of these
positions are clearly, incontrovertibly correct, as this section shows; at
any rate, none is likely to be proved more or less persuasive because,
as the next section shows, the issue is unlikely to ever be resolved by
the U.S. Supreme Court.
Much of the debate turns on implications drawn from the
constitutional text, which may seem curious since the U.S.
Constitution makes no reference to filibusters, or unlimited debate, or
whether simple majorities are needed to pass a bill in the Senate. In
289
Only a few years ago, the debate was dismissed as having been clearly decided
in favor of the filibuster’s constitutionality. See Virginia A. Seitz & Joseph R. Guerra, A
Constitutional Defense of Entrenched Senate Rules Governing Debate, 20 J.L. & POL. 1, 1
(2004) (describing the scholarly analysis as “uniform” in perceiving its
constitutionality). However, recent cases and controversies have reignited the debate.
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 249 (“[E]ntrenchment frustrates the
legislative accountability that is essential for a properly functioning democratic
government.”).
290
See Hatch, supra note 10, at A15 (describing Senator Hatch’s feeling that
reconciliation as a counter to the filibuster “degrade[s] our system of government”).
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fact, the text does not provide any rule of vote aggregation for
ordinary Senate business, including enacting legislation. Instead, the
Constitution empowers the Senate to make its own rules.291 We argue
that this provision of power is ultimately determinative, in that it
prevents judicial resolution of the issue. Nevertheless, both sides of
the debate emphasize the text heavily, both for what it contains and
what it leaves out.
The Constitution’s text does include several supermajority-voting
requirements for certain events, such as a congressional override of a
presidential veto,292 and the expulsion of a member293 (there are, in
fact, seven of these total).294 One’s interpretation of the presence of
these supermajority requirements in the Constitution, and the
contrasting silence about voting requirements for any other matter in
Congress, tends strongly to correlate with whether one wants to
eliminate or protect the filibuster.
It is arguable that these seven areas imply either that only those
matters to which the Constitution assigns supermajority requirements
need a specified number of votes — or that, by implication, all other
matters require fewer votes.295 The interpretive canon of expressio unius
buttresses the former argument: the fact that the Constitution does
specify a numerical minimum for some votes implies that it has no
requirement for others. Others go further, arguing that “the central
principle underlying the Constitution is governance through
supermajority rules.”296 This claim is belied by the Federalist Papers,
in which both Madison297 and Hamilton298 opined against a general
legislative supermajority requirement.
291
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings . . . .”).
292
Id. § 7, cl. 2.
293
Id. § 5, cl. 2 (“[A]nd, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”).
294
See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution, 80 TEX. L. REV. 703, 706 (2002) [hereinafter Our Supermajoritarian
Constitution] (listing all seven supermajority voting requirements).
295
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 240 (outlining both sides of the
argument).
296
McGinnis & Rappaport, Our Supermajoritarian Constitution, supra note 294, at
705.
297
THE FEDERALIST NO. 58 (James Madison) (1787) (a requirement of more than a
majority to pass legislation would have meant that “the fundamental principle of free
government would be reversed. It would be no longer the majority that would rule:
the power would be transferred to the minority”).
298
Id. NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[T]he fundamental maxim of republican
government[] requires that the sense of the majority should prevail . . . . To give a
minority a negative upon the majority (which is always the case where more than a
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A different emphasis, which many of the constitutional objections to
the filibuster rely on, is an assumption that majority rule is the Senate’s
constitutionally-ordained lodestar — but, as Michael Gerhardt points
out, this claim rests on a dubious basis.299 The term “majority” is
mentioned in the legislative content of the document just once, in
stating that a majority is enough to constitute a quorum.300 Thus, what
effect the absence of any reference to “majorities” has in the
Constitution is up for discussion — there exist many different vertical
aggregation mechanisms. For example, as Catherine Fisk and Erwin
Chemerinsky argue, the Constitution’s list of seven supermajority
circumstances is not necessarily exhaustive, and certainly is not
explicitly so.301
Without a clear textual cue as to how many votes the Framers
believed should be required to enact a piece of legislation, opponents
of the filibuster’s constitutionality occasionally resort to analogy
instead. Josh Chafetz, for example, posits a fictional Senate rule that
would not allow seating of a member unless that member acquired
sixty percent of the popular vote.302 Just as with the filibuster, he
writes, there is no constitutional provision blocking such a rule — and
yet it “simply cannot be constitutional,” because a “Constitution
written in the name of We the People cannot tolerate this sort of selfentrenchment by incumbents.”303 Yet it is exactly this sort of
supermajority that makes amendment of the Constitution so difficult
— a provision that enforces a kind of self-entrenchment.304 It is far
from clear whether the same must be true of the filibuster.
This debate, however, appears destined to be relegated to the pages
of law review articles, without any actual judicial assistance or
interest. Reality may have set in for academic filibuster opponents in
majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense of the
greater number to that of the lesser.”)
299
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutionality of the Filibuster, 21 CONST. COMMENT.
445, 448 (2004) (“[T]hese arguments are circular. They each assume rather than
establish the conclusion that majority rule is a fixed, constitutional principle within
the Senate.”).
300
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
301
Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 24-41.
302
Josh Chafetz, The Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1003,
1011-12 (2011) [hereinafter Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster].
303
Id. at 1012.
304
U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall
deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention for proposing Amendments, [and] . . . ratified by the Legislatures of three
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof.”).
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December 2012, when the District Court for the District of Columbia
dismissed a lawsuit by four members of the House along with the nonprofit group Common Cause seeking to declare the filibuster
unconstitutional.305 The plaintiffs had sought an injunction to prevent
Vice President Biden in his capacity as Senate President along with
various Senate staffers (including the Parliamentarian) from enforcing
the Senate’s Rule 22, which permits the filibuster to exist and thus to
require a supermajority of sixty votes to pass legislation.306 Their
primary argument: the filibuster is not majoritarian but
supermajoritarian, and “[t]he Framers of the Constitution refused to
require more than the vote of a simple majority except in six carefully
defined circumstances . . . .”307 This reading appeared somewhat
disingenuous, as it assumed a default condition — majority rule for
the passage of a bill — that it never proved.308
The district court was unswayed by the complaint’s criticism of the
filibuster. Although it conceded that “even the mere threat of a
filibuster is powerful enough to completely forestall legislative
action,”309 the court dispatched the Common Cause suit on multiple
grounds, most resoundingly on the question of justiciability.310 First,
the court pointed out, as it clearly had to, that the Senate has the
power to make its own rules; it then decided that the Senate rule in
question was not limited by any constitutional provision.311 The
plaintiffs tried to overcome that argument by alleging that the Framers

305
Common Cause v. Biden, 909 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12, 31 (D.D.C. 2012). The House
members included Representatives John Lewis, Michael Michaud, Hank Johnson, and
Keith Ellison. Id. at 15.
306
See Complaint, supra note 17, at *2, *15-16.
307
Id. at *4.
308
See Gerhardt, supra note 299, at 460 (“[T]he argument that filibusters allow a
minority to preclude the Senate from fulfilling its institutional obligations mistakenly
equates the institution with a majority within it. Yet again, critics of the filibuster have
assumed their conclusion. In no place does the Constitution equate a majority of the
Senate with the institution itself.”). The complaint goes on to directly assert that the
Presentment Clause (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2) states that “only the vote of a simple
majority of a quorum of each house of Congress would be required for passage of a
bill.” Complaint, supra note 17, at *25. This is creative writing. If the Presentment
Clause actually contained such a command, the cloture rule would not exist, and this
debate would never have been possible.
309
Common Cause, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 12.
310
Id. at 27. The court also found that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue, id. at
18, but did not reach the defendants’ argument that the Speech or Debate clause also
barred the suit, id. at 31 n.19. It did not have to, as its other grounds for dismissal
made such a finding unnecessary.
311
Id. at 27-29. But see infra text accompanying note 361 (discussing Powell).
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did limit how many votes the Senate may require for a piece of
legislation by placing some supermajority provisions in the
Constitution. But “[t]his is simply not the case,” Judge Sullivan wrote.
“None of these provisions contains any language that expressly limits
the Senate’s power to determine its rules, including when and how
debate is brought to a close.”312 The court’s language became even
more plain when considering the extent to which the plaintiffs’
request for an injunction would force judicial intrusion into legislative
affairs:
Plaintiffs provide no authority . . . for the proposition that the
Court’s review of an internal rule of Congress, rather than a
legislative act, would reflect respect for the Constitution and
not a lack of respect for the Senate, particularly where, as here,
Plaintiffs have identified no constitutional restraint on the
Senate’s power to make rules regulating debate.313
Perhaps the Common Cause complaint was simply poorly written or
reasoned. But future litigation is unlikely to fare any better. Without a
controlling provision in the Constitution on the subject of how exactly
the Senate is to vote, or a convincing extrapolation of one, the courts
are likely to rely on long-settled separation-of-power limits when
deciding whether to intervene, as this next section establishes.
B. The Empty Threat: Judicial Review of Senate Rules
The U.S. Supreme Court has developed multiple doctrines that,
taken together, display a reluctance to review the capacity of either
congressional chamber to interpret its own rules. This creates a strong
expectation that the Court would refuse to insert itself into any
conflict within the Senate over either the operation of the filibuster or
reconciliation, or their reform.
1.

The Filibuster as a Political Question

As the Court stated in United States v. Ballin, when considering
whether a facially valid act of Congress can be challenged because
there may not have been a quorum to pass it:
The [C]onstitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
312
313

Id.
Id. at 31.
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there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceeding established by the rule and the result
which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all
matters of method are open to the determination of the house,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate or even more just . . . . It
is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
house, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal.314
As this quote makes clear, there are some exceptional circumstances
where the Court will overcome its general disinclination to assess
Senate or House procedure, as the next section details. However,
judicial intrusions of this kind have been few, and limited in
application. In contrast, multiple mechanisms exist for the Court to
avoid addressing a conflict between the minority and the majority over
the constitutionality of either filibuster reform or the application of
reconciliation.
In terms of any challenge to the use of the filibuster itself, the Court
is extremely unlikely to involve itself. As we have seen, the filibuster is
somewhat analogous to senatorial courtesy, which has not been
directly challenged in federal court. However, three of the most
controversial exercises of senatorial courtesy by the New Jersey State
Senate have led to judicial challenges in New Jersey state courts. The
first was by citizens who claimed their rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the New Jersey Constitution were violated by senators
rejecting nominees for public office for purely personal reasons.315 The
second arrived because a disproportionately large number of judicial
vacancies existed in a particular county due to the exercise of
senatorial courtesy.316 The third arose because a sitting judge’s
renomination lapsed due to the exercise of senatorial courtesy.317 In
each case, the justices recognized that senatorial courtesy was a long
tradition which each court was powerless to prevent.318 To attempt to
promote individual rights contrary to internal Senate rules would
“involve delving into the thought processes and motivations which led
each individual senator to vote or not vote as he did,”319 which the
314

144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
Kligerman v. Lynch, 223 A.2d 511, 512 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1966).
316
Passaic Cnty. Bar Ass’n v. Hughes, 260 A.2d 261, 262-64 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1969).
317
De Vesa v. Dorsey, 634 A.2d 493, 495-97 (N.J. 1993).
318
Kligerman, 223 A.2d at 513; Hughes, 260 A.2d at 267; De Vesa, 634 A.2d at 504.
319
Kligerman, 223 A.2d at 513.
315
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court has consistently refused to do. Challenges to exercises of the
filibuster are likely to receive the same short shrift.
A challenge based instead on protecting the filibuster from reform, or
use of reconciliation, on the basis of protecting the rights of the
minority, taps more naturally into conceptions of the U.S. Supreme
Court as having a special role as protector of minority rights.320
Nonetheless, such a challenge is little more likely to receive serious
review by the Court.
Most naturally, the Court would turn to the political question
doctrine.321 All of Baker v. Carr’s three central boundary questions
would arguably apply to discourage review of any challenge by a
minority against a majority for weakening minoritarian rights.322 First
and most glaringly, resolution of the issue would involve addressing
questions “committed by the text of the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of Government,” since Article 1, Section 5 of the Constitution
provides that each house may determine the rules of its proceedings.
On this basis, the Court has refused to entertain multiple challenges
analogous to the arguments proposed in the previous section relating
to the filibuster and reconciliation. As well as refusing to examine
whether quorum existed contrary to the recording of quorum in the
Senate, as mentioned above, these refusals have included, for example,
refusing to reconsider whether the Senate had properly delegated its
power over conviction to a subcommittee in an impeachment
process,323 and other like cases, as discussed below.

320
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (“There may
be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation [promotes] . . . prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”).
321
See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 47 (1849) (stating that whether the people of
the state have changed their government “is a question to be settled by the political
power. And when that power has decided, the courts are bound to take notice of its
decision, and to follow it”).
322
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (describing the elements of a political question as “a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”). These are
generally summarized as the following three inquiries. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (“As set forth in the seminal case of
Baker v. Carr, [citations] the doctrine incorporates three inquiries . . . .”).
323
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).

324

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 47:261

On the basis of this first prong alone, then, the Supreme Court
would likely refuse to address the issue, but it could possibly also
refuse on the basis of the other two Baker v. Carr prongs. The second
prong, whether resolution of the question would require the Court go
beyond its areas of judicial expertise, has the least clear
implications.324 Arguably, addressing the role of the filibuster would
be beyond judicial expertise, if only because the Court has generally
stayed out of such topics; however, the Court has some experience in
assessing the impact of rules on minority rights in analogous fields,
such as corporate law.325 But a stronger argument can be made on the
third prong, that “prudential considerations counsel against judicial
intervention,”326 because of the separation-of-powers implications of
the textual command that each chamber manage its own regulations.
While being sure not to abdicate policing the separation of powers, the
Supreme Court has been conscious to respect “the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties.”327
This implication of the third prong captures something of a
“departmentalist” view of constitutional interpretation — “that each of
the three branches of the federal government possesses independent
and coordinate authority to interpret the Constitution.”328 Though
some take departmentalism to the extreme that executives can reassess
constitutional judicial determinations de novo,329 more commonly
324
This topic is generally prone to difficulty of definition, since descriptive claims
about judicial expertise often rest on preconceptions of judicial motivations,
character, and inherent capacity and are arguably normative arguments in disguise.
Compare Lon Fuller, Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 393-405
(1978) (arguing judicial capacity is limited and so judges should exercise selfrestraint), with Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 1281, 1316 (1976) (disputing previous).
325
See, e.g., Va. Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1086-87 (1991). But
note the opinion questioned whether it is appropriate (or not) for the Court to
consider the fairness of a merger to minority shareholders, id. at 1093 n.6, and there is
arguably some reluctance to get into core debates about what is fair to minority
shareholders at the federal level (or more precisely, at the Supreme Court level), with
the Supreme Court delegating much of this issue to the state courts. See, e.g., Santa Fe
Indus., Inc., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law of
corporations that deals with transactions in securities . . . .”).
326
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998 (Powell, J., concurring).
327
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).
328
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and
Judicial Supremacy, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1031 (2004).
329
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to
Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994) (“[T]he President possesses the
power of full “legal review” of the actions of the other branches — the full power to
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departmentalists agree that while each branch may express its own
views on constitutional issues, and even vehemently disagree with the
Court’s rulings, the Court’s rulings govern constitutional questions —
at least on discrete cases.330 Either way, a departmentalist view at least
supports the position that when a judicial interpretation would
directly determine another branch’s reign over its own realm, the
Court should resist review. The enumeration of powers implies the
privilege of each branch to determine its own operation, subject to the
separation of powers.331 The reason this is a prudential consideration
for the judiciary is that since the Court wants to be respected as the
sole vessel of judicial power, it needs to similarly respect the province
of the other branches within their own spheres of influence. As such,
two of the three prongs of the political question doctrine point
strongly against judicial intervention in a dispute over the filibuster,
and the third is simply ambiguous.
In addition to the political question doctrine, the Court could use
ripeness as a means of finding non-justiciability, as it did in Goldwater
v. Carter, by refusing to determine whether President Carter’s
rescindment of a treaty with Taiwan required Senate approval, as
treaty adoption does.332 Although the Court dismissed without
comment in that case, both concurring justices argued that the issue
was a “nonjusticiable political dispute that should be left for
resolution by the Executive and Legislative Branches,”333 not the
courts, at least until there was conflict between the two branches.334
Otherwise, the Court would be potentially involving itself in the
Senate’s decision not to assert its own power; then it would effectively

review the lawfulness or correctness of their legal interpretations of the Constitution,
of federal statutes, and of treaties.”).
330
See Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen,
83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1427 & n.33 (1999) (noting Abraham Lincoln’s disagreement
with but respect for the Dred Scott decision); David W. Tyler, Clarifying
Departmentalism: How the Framers’ Vision of Judicial and Presidential Review Makes the
Case for Deductive Judicial Supremacy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2215, 2221 (2009)
(“[E]ach branch of the national government engages constitutional review, but in
which the Supreme Court provides the most telling assessments of
constitutionality.”).
331
Post & Siegel, supra note 328, at 1031-32.
332
444 U.S. 996, 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court
should have dismissed for lack of ripeness).
333
Id. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
334
Id. at 996 (Powell, J., concurring) (“[T]he Judicial Branch should not decide
issues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress, unless
the political branches have reached a constitutional impasse.”).
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not be policing process, but replacing the Senate’s substantive policy
judgment with its own.
A third alternative is that the Court could achieve the same effect by
using standing to avoid any filibuster controversy. In Raines v. Byrd,
the Court held that, despite a specific legislative provision for any
Member of Congress adversely affected by a line item veto exercised
by the president to bring an expedited judicial challenge to that
exercise, no individual or group of senators had standing for such a
challenge.335 Instead, the Court emphasized that standing restrictions
were “especially rigorous when reaching the merits of the dispute
would force us to decide whether an action taken by one of the other
two branches of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.”336 The
Court was making it clear that it would aggressively use standing as a
means of avoiding disputes within and between the elected branches.
Raines v. Byrd is particularly pertinent when contemplating any
potential challenge to filibuster reform or use of reconciliation, as it
concerned a minority of senators challenging an internal rule on the
basis that its exercise diluted their voting power. The Court
emphasized that “the abstract dilution of institutional legislative
power” is not enough to warrant judicial intrusion on the operation of
Senate rules.337 It concluded that there was no injury to these senators,
beyond any effect on them solely due to being Members of Congress
— just as would be asserted in any filibuster protection claim.
Prior precedent to the contrary could mean, the Raines Court said,
“at most,” that it would inquire whether there had been total effective
nullification of a Senator’s vote.338 To give an illustration of such
nullification, the Court referred to the possibility of a bill erroneously
passing when it otherwise would not have, when a majority of votes
were not actually cast. But rather than giving any consideration to the
possibility of minoritarian voting rights, the Court instead emphasized
that senators could vote to repeal such legislation — and presumably
any rule change — and so there was no meaningful harm to the
interests, even in the long run.339 As such, Raines almost directly
addresses any potential claim that could be brought on the basis of

335
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (“[T]hese individual members of
Congress do not have a sufficient ‘personal stake’ in this dispute and have not alleged
a sufficiently concrete injury to have established Article III standing.”).
336
Id. at 819-20.
337
Id. at 826.
338
Id. at 823.
339
Id. at 824.
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minoritarian rights under the filibuster, and dismisses them for lack of
standing.
There is good reason for this reluctance by the Court to involve
itself in internal congressional disputes: while the judiciary is meant to
police the Constitution, it cannot overly police the political branches
without impinging on separation of powers itself. This is illustrated in
Nixon v. United States, which concerned the impeachment of Judge
Walter Nixon.340 Judge Nixon was convicted by the Senate, but the
hearings on his impeachment were held by a Senate committee, which
he argued was contrary to the constitutional provision that “the Senate
shall have sole power to try all impeachments.”341 Nixon argued that
the term “sole” implied that the duty was non-delegable to a
committee; but the Court held the issue to be non-reviewable, both
because the term “sole” meant that there was nothing for the judiciary
to review342 and because impeachment is the mechanism of legislatures
reviewing judges, so judges could thus not review legislatures
reviewing judges.343 This may be a particularly stark illustration of
how separation-of-powers problems could arise were the Supreme
Court to go against its tradition of refraining from reviewing internal
Senate rules, but the principle applies even when unconcerned with
the oversight of one’s own overseer.
There are thus many strongly buttressed means of rejecting judicial
challenges to filibuster reform. However, opposition to such reform
could also challenge not the actual change itself, but rather the means
of such a change, particularly as exercised by a bare majority. This
argument posits that even if the Senate has sole power over its own
rules, it is still subject to the rest of the Constitution,344 including the
protection of minorities and their right to exercise the filibuster
against any attempt to reform the filibuster. But given the clarity of the
Constitution’s textual empowerment of the Senate to craft its own
340

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6; Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
342
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231 (“The commonsense meaning of the word ‘sole’ is that
the Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be
acquitted or convicted.”).
343
Id. at 234-35 (“[J]udicial review would be inconsistent with the Framers’
insistence that our system be one of checks and balances. In our constitutional system,
impeachment was designed to be the only check on the Judicial Branch by the
Legislature.”).
344
Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J.
1539, 1541 (1995) (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 “does not authorize the House to
violate fundamental principles of constitutional democracy. It simply authorizes the
House to organize itself for informed and efficient debate and decision.”)
341
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rules, this challenge to the “nuclear option” ultimately collapses down
to the same claim of minority rights protection dismissed above.
A persuasive analysis of the legitimacy of both the filibuster and its
amendment by the Senate chamber was put forth by none other than
Vice President Richard Nixon in his capacity as Chair of the Senate.345
Nixon argued that the constitutional provision for one-third of the
Senate to change in every election indicated; “[T]he intent of the
framers that the Senate should be a continuing parliamentary body for
at least some purposes. By practice for 167 years the rules of the
Senate have been continued from one Congress to another.”346 Those
procedural rules include the filibuster. On the other hand, “there can
be no question that the majority of the new existing membership of
the Senate . . . . ha[s] the power to determine the rules under which
the Senate will proceed.”347 These two positions are nonetheless
reconcilable: the latter takes precedence, and any rule restricting the
power of the majority by the will of the previous Congress is
unconstitutional; however, unless the Senate indicates its will to the
contrary, the old rules will be assumed to be effective.348 Nixon’s
concise analysis provides a reasonable interpretation that supports
both the constitutionality of the filibuster and the constitutionality of
majoritarian changes to the filibuster. The only constitutional
restriction that arises for Nixon from looking at the constitutional text
and practice is on the entrenchment of a supermajority rule, and so by
implication his analysis supports changes to the filibuster being made
by a simple majority.349
Furthermore, while U.S. courts have not addressed the question,
other common law countries have a well-developed jurisprudence
around the general rule that legislatures cannot ordinarily entrench a
supermajority rule. Essentially, supermajority rules can apply to all
procedures except those that consider amendment to the rule, unless
under exacting rules of manner and form.350 To do otherwise is to bind
345

103 CONG. REC. 178 (daily ed., Jan. 4, 1957).
Id.
347
Id.
348
Id. at 179. With one important exception — “[T]hat the Senate should not be
bound by any provision in those previous rules which denies the membership of the
Senate the power to exercise its constitutional right to make its own rules.” Id.
349
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 46, at 249 (“[E]ntrenchment frustrates the
legislative accountability that is essential for a properly functioning democratic
government”).
350
See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Note, Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment
of a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L.J. 457 (1991) (summarizing the
doctrine).
346
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subsequent legislatures to the will of the current body. The same
principle ought to apply at least equally to the U.S. Senate, since all
legislatures have limits on their powers, and this rule essentially
mandates a basic limit on the ability of a legislature to change its own
powers,351 a principle well-established by U.S. courts.352 As such, the
nuclear option controversy has the logic reversed: it is the application
of the filibuster to legislative reconsideration of the filibuster rule that
raises constitutional problems. But again, this conclusion is unlikely to
be articulated directly by the courts, since they are unlikely to
consider the issue.
The consequent notion of the Senate’s complete freedom to create
its own rules raises the conundrum that a unanimity requirement for
all legislation on one hand, or a coin flip on the other, would be
equally unreviewable. Indeed, many of the arguments against the
filibuster rely on pointing out the potential for such absurdities.353 And
in fact the strong implication from the Nixon Court majority was that
the Senate could flip a coin to decide Nixon’s fate, if it so chose —
only one concurring justice was willing to question such an
outcome.354 Yet the Court is likely to be unwilling, and rightly so, to
step in to either abolish a core Senate procedure or restrict its reform.
Nonetheless, such stringent or lax voting rules have somehow never
materialized. Something else, then, is policing the Senate. And as the
emergence of reconciliation indicates, that something, however
gingerly its approach, may be the Senate itself.
2.

The Limited Exceptions to Reviewing Senate Rules

The Court’s avoidance of reviewing the propriety of the Senate’s
interpretation of its own rules and procedures is consistent with the
political question doctrine; however, there have been some cases
where the Supreme Court has stepped in, as described below. But in
351
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Constitution, 22
CANADIAN J.L. AND JURISPRUDENCE 1 (2009) (arguing the same principle applies in the
U.S., since all legislatures have limits on their powers, particularly on the ability to
change its own powers), available at www.law.cam.ac.uk/faculty-resources/
10006399.pdf.
352
See discussion infra section IV.B.2.
353
See, e.g., Chafetz, Unconstitutionality of the Filibuster, supra note 302, at 1014
(“[I]f the Senate can require sixty votes for passage, why not seventy or eighty?”).
354
Justice Souter suggested review may be appropriate in such a circumstance, but
did not describe the criteria for making such an assessment. See Nixon v. United
States, 506 U.S. 224, 253-54 (“If the Senate were to act in a manner seriously
threatening the integrity of its results, convicting, say, upon a coin toss . . . judicial
interference might well be appropriate.”).
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those few cases, there are generally other considerations at play that
mandate judicial involvement. Most notably, the Court has stressed
that when Senate action affects the rights of others, the Court is
obliged to act, even though doing so involves itself in overseeing
Senate rules.355 We note another circumstance where the Court has
stepped in, and is likely to do so again: when in defining its rules, the
Senate overreaches, attempting to manipulate its own separation-of
powers-constraints. We argue, however, that neither exception applies
to any likely conflict over the filibuster, and so, despite these
exceptions, the Court is nevertheless still likely to refrain from
deciding the fate of the filibuster or reconciliation.
When legislative procedure affects the rights of others, such as when
a lawful commission is being denied, application of congressional
rules can become a judicial question. This is particularly the case if the
individual whose rights are being affected has been singled out for
especially unfavorable treatment — recognized as early as Marbury v.
Madison.356 This is true not only where, as in Marbury, a right such as
a commission is being denied to a citizen outside of the legislative
sphere, but also to a decision of a legislative chamber to deny a right
to one of its own, as illustrated in Powell v. McCormack.357 In Powell,
Representative Adam Clayton Powell had been accused of corruption,
for submitting deceptive travel expenses and making illegal salary
payments to his wife. But instead of taking formal action against
Powell, upon his re-election, the House simply excluded him from
taking his seat in the new Congress. As the Court stressed in Raines,
Powell concerned action by a legislative chamber that affected the
rights of an individual — in this case to take up the seat that he had
rightfully won in an election. Challenge to such a rule, however, even
if concerning internal legislative procedure, is not ultimately about the
operation of the legislature at all, but rather about a body (that
happens to be a legislative body) improperly discriminating against an
individual. The Raines Court distinguished Powell in these terms,
terms that would appear to apply to a challenge concerning the
filibuster:
Powell does not help appellees. First, appellees have not been
singled out for specially unfavorable treatment as opposed to
other Members of their respective bodies. Their claim is that
the Act causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of
355
356
357

See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821 (1997).
5 U.S. 137, 139 (1803).
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 489 (1969).
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legislative power), which necessarily damages all Members of
Congress and both Houses of Congress equally. Second,
appellees do not claim that they have been deprived of
something to which they personally are entitled — such as
their seats as Members of Congress after their constituents had
elected them. Rather, appellees’ claim of standing is based on a
loss of political power, not loss of any private right, which
would make the injury more concrete.358
The Raines Court made clear that, absent some specific
circumstances whereby an individual has been injured by the
operation or undermining of the filibuster directly — an injury that
would have to go beyond any diminution in their voting power — the
first exception would simply not apply, and so the Court would be
unlikely to involve itself in the question.
Powell also illustrates the second exception. The Court suggested
that if the House had chosen to expel Powell, consistent with the
Constitution,359 for failing to meet the qualifications that the
Constitution prescribes,360 that decision would probably be immune to
judicial review,361 since the House has exclusive power to determine
the qualifications of its members.362 However, by simply excluding
him from his rightful seat, the House had effectively imposed
additional qualifications that it had extra-constitutionally created.363
As such, the Court concluded that the case was justiciable, and not a
political question.364 Rather than being a circumstance where, as in
Nixon, the Court felt it had to avoid addressing the question of the
treatment of an individual before a legislative chamber, out of respect
for the separation of powers, in Powell, judicial involvement was
required in order to promote constitutional checks and balances.
358

Raines, 521 U.S. at 821 (emphasis in original).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that the House has authority to expel a
member “with the Concurrence of two thirds”).
360
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 cl. 2 (“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which
he shall be chose.”).
361
Powell, 395 U.S. at 548 (“Art. I, § 5, is at most a ‘textually demonstrable
commitment’ to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the
Constitution,” for which the political question argument could be maintained).
362
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (“Each house shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.”).
363
See Powell, 395 U.S. at 508 (“Nor is the distinction between exclusion and
expulsion merely one of form.”).
364
Id. at 549.
359
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Otherwise, a legislative chamber would have been able to effectively
nullify the Constitution’s mandate of a two-thirds vote requirement to
expel a member if it could achieve the same effect through a majority
vote for exclusion.365
The distinction between Powell and Nixon, then, makes clear that a
second exemption exists to its general refusal to review a chamber’s
power of self-governance: the Court cannot allow a congressional
chamber to interpret its own rules if, in doing so, the chamber would
be effectively creating for itself more power than the Constitution
provides. This exception applies not only to prohibiting a chamber to
promote its own power, but also to prohibiting it from diminishing the
power of another coequal branch, as exemplified by United States v.
Smith.366
Smith concerned a presidential nomination to the Federal Power
Commission. The Senate confirmed the nomination, but, consistent
with its rules that allowed for reconsideration within two days of the
confirming vote, requested the president return the name of the
appointee, which the president refused to do. The Senate disputed
whether Smith was therefore duly appointed. The Court found that,
although the Senate’s interpretation of its own rules is always given
great weight, when such a construction could constitute a self-serving
post hoc expansion of its own power, it is less persuasive.367 The Court
refused to adopt the Senate’s construction of its own rules, as doing so
would have mitigated the president’s power by preventing the
president from proceeding with any authority without first checking
back with the Senate.368 So the Senate’s interpretation of its rule was
really a mechanism of controlling what the executive could do in
response to its actions. Respecting that would not promote the
separation of powers, but rather undermine it.
As such, not all Senate interpretation of its rules deserves equal
respect from the Court, but there is no reason to think that filibuster
litigation would raise such a separation-of-powers issue to warrant
judicial intervention. The filibuster is an internal Senate rule that
determines when and how a vote can be held to have passed; it is not a
mechanism of claiming that, once passed, a vote could be retracted, or
any other similar inter-branch challenge; nor is it a means of
undermining a restriction on Senate power, or any other similar mode
365
Id. at 547 (allowing a majority-vote exclusion “would effectively nullify the
Convention’s decision to require a two-thirds vote for expulsion”).
366
286 U.S. 6, 35 (1932).
367
Id. at 33.
368
Id. at 35.
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of expanding its own power. To the contrary, the filibuster actually
slows the Senate’s business, and so its reach of influence. But that does
not suggest that instead filibuster reform or reconciliation are any
more likely to fit one of these exceptions. The effect of the filibuster is
simply to alter the balance of power between different groups within
the Senate — which the Court has explicitly refused to recognize as an
adequate injury to justify its intervention. Whether filibuster litigation
concerned a majority challenging the effect of the filibuster or a
minority challenging an attempt to abolish or mitigate it, the Court is
unlikely to be tempted to resolve the question.
3.

Recess Appointments: Not a New Exception

The 2013 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
in Noel Canning v. NLRB — that the Senate cannot properly be in
recess during midsession recesses, or adjournments, and so the
president cannot make recess appointments — may appear to
constitute an additional exception, but this impression is
misleading.369
The case concerned appointments to the National Labor Relations
Board, which require the advice and consent of the Senate, unless the
Senate is in recess, when the president can then make recess
appointments to unilaterally temporarily fill the positions.370 Using a
tactic first employed from 2007 to 2009 by the Democrats to prevent
recess appointments by President Bush,371 in January 2012 Republican
Members of Congress372 refused to go into formal recess, holding brief
“pro forma” sessions with the sole purpose of preventing a formal
recess, and thus any recess appointments by President Obama. The
President, claiming that the Senate was effectively in recess regardless
of the pro forma proceedings, made the recess appointments, and the
decision of the subsequently constituted Board was challenged for lack

369
See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 506 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (ruling that,
considering the text, history, and structure of the Constitution, reference to “the
Recess” is limited to intersession recesses).
370
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3 (“The President shall have Power to fill up all
Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of the next Session.”); Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 493.
371
See Jeff VanDam, The Kill Switch: The New Battle Over Presidential Recess
Appointments, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 361, 376-78 (2012) (tracking history of pro forma
session as obstructionist strategy).
372
The House can prevent the Senate from adjourning. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
cl. 4 (“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of
the other, adjourn for more than three days . . . .”).
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of quorum.373 The court upheld this challenge, concluding that the
appointments were invalid from their inception.374
The court held that “the appointments structure would have been
turned upside down if the President could make appointments any
time the Senate so much as broke for lunch,” or in any other
undefined number of days break.375 “Allowing the President to define
the scope of his own appointments power would eviscerate the
Constitution’s separation of powers.”376
The court was essentially refusing to allow the President’s
interpretation of Senate rules to trump its own. It is one thing to allow
the Senate to follow its own determination of its own rules, but the
position rejected by the court would have instead allowed the
President to determine congressional rules. Here, the Senate majority
did determine its own rules — that it was not going to recess. As such,
the case was not about either chamber being allowed to interpret its
own rules, but rather about the President’s ability to interpret Senate
rules in his own favor, and so does not constitute an exception to the
courts’ reluctance to disfavor judicial intervention in the selfgovernance of a coequal branch.
Akhil Amar has characterized this action as a “serious wound” to
democracy, since it recognized the Senate minority — in the form of
amicus curiae377 — as the proper representatives of the Senate, and
empowered its members to stymie the “tacit consent” of the majority
and so to undermine “Senate majority rule for executive branch
appointments.”378 But this misrepresents the basis for the decision.
Amar would have the Court make a functional assessment of “what a
majority of senators in fact favored,” and characterized not doing so as
the court empowering the minority of senators, the amici, to
373

Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 497.
Id. at 507.
375
Id. at 503.
376
Id. at 504.
377
Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and 41 other members of the U.S.
Senate wrote in support of petitioner Noel Canning. See Brief for Amici Curiae Senate
Republican Leader Mitch McConnell and 41 Other Members of the U.S. Senate in
Support of Petitioner/Cross-Respondent Noel Canning, Noel Canning, 705 F.3d (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-1115, 12-1153).
378
Akhil Reed Amar, Senate Democracy Is Dead, SLATE (Jan. 30, 2013, 3:33 PM)
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2013/01/filibuster_refo
rm_failure_and_recess_appointment_ruling_death_of_senate.html (“[T]he judges in
effect recognized them — the minority! — as the Senate’s proper spokesmen [over
appointments that] . . . probably had the tacit consent of Reid and the Democrats
[which would have] . . . restored Senate majority rule for executive branch
appointments during midsession recesses.”).
374
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overwhelm that majority preference by preventing the president from
overcoming Senate filibusters of his nominees.379 However, the Senate
majority failed to intervene to prevent the outcome, either in the
legislative or judicial sphere. As the concurrence said in Goldwater v.
Carter: “Neither the Senate [n]or the House has rejected the
President’s claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront the
President, it is not our task to do so.”380 The fact that a minority of
senators wrote an amicus was not even addressed by the court. As
such, Raines v. Byrd did not arise as an issue, and so characterizing this
case as a judicial enforcement of the filibuster, or minoritarian power
more generally, is misleading. Rather, if the court had gone digging
into what the majority “truly wanted,” disregarding formal
appearances, then it really would have been undermining
departmentalist respect for each branch interpreting its own rules.
As such, Noel Canning is simply the flipside to Smith, as Powell was
to Nixon. Just as the Supreme Court had refused to allow the Senate to
impose its interpretation on a presidential exercise of power, the
circuit court refused to allow the president to interpret Senate rules in
a self-aggrandizing manner. Accordingly, this case fits within the short
list of circumstances for court intervention, and does not pose a
meaningful exception to the rule that the courts will attempt as much
as possible, to leave the determination of Senate rules to the Senate.381
It leaves intact the strong precedent, and equally strong expectation,
that the fate of the filibuster rests not in the legal realm, but in the
political realm.
379

Id.
444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
381
The court nonetheless muddied the issue and opened itself up to criticism by
unnecessarily outlining a novel constitutional argument in addition to its central
determination. After acknowledging that its ruling on the first constitutional argument
was sufficient to determine the case, the court nonetheless went on to embrace a
second constitutional argument that was considerably more radical. The court
concluded that as well as only empowering the president to make recess appointments
during an intersessional recess, the court declared that the power was limited to
making those appointments that arose during an intersessional recess. It interpreted
the president’s “[p]ower to fill up all [v]acancies that may happen during the
[r]ecess,” by interpreting “happen” to mean “happen to arise,” i.e. “to begin,” rather
than to mean “happen to exist.” Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 511-12. For this more
revolutionary interpretation, the court found it necessary to justify its failure to defer
to the Senate in the determination of its own rules, concluding that “The Senate’s
desires do not determine the Constitution’s meaning. The Constitution’s separationof-powers features, of which the Appointments Clause is one, do not simply protect
one branch from another. These structural provisions serve to protect the people, for it
is ultimately the people’s rights that suffer when one branch encroaches on another.”
Id.
380
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C. The Neutered Review Power of the Parliamentarian
In theory, the Senate possesses another potential veto point —
indeed, a supposed neutral adjudicator — in the Parliamentarian, a
nonpartisan, nonpolitical appointee. The Parliamentarian, who has a
cohort in the House, has several duties, not least of which is the ability
to assist the chair of any proceeding in deciding a question on the
rules — such as those on Byrd Rule points of order against
reconciliation maneuvers. (Former Parliamentarian Floyd Riddick has
said that the Parliamentarian “whispers” the correct procedures into
the Chair’s ear.382) That adjudicatory role uniquely places the
Parliamentarian “at the nexus of Senate rules and the behavior of
individual members.”383 The “parls,” as they are called, have
increasingly been forced in recent decades to rule upon new complex
points of order,384 just as knowledge of procedural rules in the Senate
has deteriorated.385 Reconciliation represents perhaps the largest part
of this relatively new role.386 Yet despite some episodes of
independence, and latitude over the whims and wills of senators, the
Parliamentarian, like anyone else, can be ignored — or worse, and
perhaps more often, fired.
In fact, the very first Parliamentarian was fired, after serving the
Senate for nearly six decades. Charles Lee Watkins came to the Senate
in 1904 as a stenographer for a senator from his home state of
Arkansas,387 and left at the hands of Majority Leader Michael
382
James Wallner, Parliamentary Rule: The Origins, Development, and Role of the
Senate Parliamentarian in the Legislative Process 17 (Ann. Meeting of the Cong. & Hist.
Conf. 2011), available at http://www.brown.edu/conference/congress-and-history/
sites/brown.edu.conference.congress-and-history/files/uploads/Parliamentary%20Rule%20Wallner.pdf.
383
Id. at 3.
384
David Rogers, Elizabeth MacDonough Is Senate’s First Female Parliamentarian,
POLITICO (Feb. 6, 2012, 11:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0212/
72526.html (“[T]he Senate parliamentarian’s office can’t escape the partisan turmoil of
the modern Congress. And that task has only gotten harder with more action-forcing
laws that require the parliamentarian to rule on elaborate points of order and even
triggering events on a world stage.”).
385
Wallner, supra note 382, at 19.
386
See Alexander Bolton, After Nearly 20 Years, Senate Parliamentarian Alan Frumin
to Retire, THE HILL (Jan. 31, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/
207635-senate-parliamentarian-alan-frumin-to-retire-setting-up-big-question-for-nextcongress [hereinafter Alan Frumin] (“But perhaps the biggest job of the
[P]arliamentarian is to decide what can and cannot be done under the reconciliation
process, which allows the Senate to pass legislation with a simple majority instead of
the usual 60 votes.”).
387
See Donald A. Ritchie, Charles Lee Watkins, in ARKANSAS BIOGRAPHY: A
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Mansfield. Watkins was beloved — a filibuster was once halted to
wish him happy birthday388 — and he was credited with
“crystalliz[ing]” the office of Parliamentarian,389 having never allowed
Charles Dawes, Vice President to Calvin Coolidge, to be overruled as
Chair.390 Yet Mansfield dismissed Watkins, apparently because his
failing memory had tempered his otherwise “vise”-like mind.391 “I’ll
find something else to do,” the eighty-five-year-old Watkins said as he
left office.392
The same fate befell Robert Dove, the Parliamentarian during the
Bush tax cut debate of 2001, who through his rules interpretations
“made it hard for the leadership to plot a strategy.”393 His ruling
against using reconciliation for tax cuts was circumvented, and then
he was fired. In fact, the 2001 episode was not his first dismissal:
Senator Byrd fired him when Democrats gained control of Congress in
1987, a move that was considered unusual at the time.394 Yet the
rationale was simply the displeasure of Senator Byrd, himself a master
parliamentarian, over an unfavorable ruling Dove had made the
previous year (which was later defeated by 87 votes).395 Once Byrd
gained the gavel over the Senate, Dove became unemployed.396
COLLECTION OF NOTABLE LIVES 302 (Nancy A. Williams & Jeannie M. Whayne eds.,
2000).
388
C.P. Trussell, Senate Aide Ends a 59-Year Career, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1964, at 5.
389
Anthony J. Madonna, The Evolution of Frustration: Revisiting the Role of
Inherited Institutions in the United States Senate 147 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Washington University in St. Louis) (quoting another former
Parliamentarian, Charles J. Riddick).
390
See Rules Arbiter Retires After 60 Years on Hill, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 1964, at A1.
Watkins was responsible for educating famous figures such as Senators Richard
Russell and Lyndon B. Johnson on Senate procedure. See ROBERT A. CARO, MASTER OF
THE SENATE 152, 177, 391 (2003).
391
See July 1, 1935: First Official Parliamentarian, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.
gov/artandhistory/history/minute/First_Official_Parliamentarian.htm (last visited Feb.
11, 2013).
392
Trussell, supra note 388, at 5.
393
See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text.
394
David L. Wilson et al., People: Washington’s Movers and Shakers, NAT’L J., June
27, 1987, at 1678. After being fired, Dove promptly went to work as a consultant for
Senate Republicans, though that did not prevent him from regaining his old job as
Parliamentarian later. Id.
395
Wayne King & Warren Weaver, Jr., Washington Talk: Briefing; Of Rules and
Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1987, § 1, at 8.
396
Dove himself replaced Murray Zweben, who retired just before Republicans
could discard him in 1981 upon their taking control of the Senate; Zweben had
written an amicus brief in support of a Jimmy Carter policy, which angered Senator
Barry Goldwater, among others. See Albert Eisele, Parliamentarian Fired? It’s Not the
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Before the firings, of course, the Parliamentarian does retain
relevance, a good deal of it related to ruling on reconciliation and Byrd
Rule challenges. The current Parliamentarian, Elizabeth MacDonough
— the first woman to serve in the job397 — has stood up to
congressional leaders. In April 2012, just two months after taking the
job, she issued a key ruling against Majority Leader Reid, preventing
him from blocking Republican budget proposals and votes.398 The onepage opinion she released on the issue reads like an administrative law
exam response, noting that the question is “subject to multiple,
reasonable interpretations.”399 That her ruling went against the senator
who first requested it400 no doubt increased its credibility. And during
the Obamacare debate, the Parliamentarian, Alan Frumin, became
“one of the most talked-about men in Washington”401 for his ability to
make seemingly crucial rulings. However, it likely did not harm
Frumin’s job prospects that his rulings on Obamacare and
reconciliation favored the majority-party Democrats.402 And it should
also be noted that Frumin’s stint as Parliamentarian during the
Obamacare debates was not his first. He, too, was previously fired
from the job in 1995; when the Republicans came back into power and
put Robert Dove back in the chair.403
First Time, THE HILL, May 16, 2001.
397
See Rogers, supra note 384.
398
See Scott Wong, Harry Reid Loses Procedural Ruling on Budget Vote, POLITICO
(Apr. 3, 2012, 11:38 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0412/74801.html.
399
Letter from Elizabeth MacDonough, Senate Parliamentarian, to Members of
Senate (Apr. 3, 2012), available at http://images.politico.com/global/2012/04/
macdonough_opinion.pdf.
400
See Wong, supra note 398 (noting that Senate Budget Committee Chairman
Kent Conrad had requested the ruling, which when released “turn[ed] up the heat” on
him because it would allow Republican opposition members to offer alternative
budget proposals).
401
Jada F. Smith, In a First, a Woman Will Be Senate Parliamentarian, N.Y. TIMES
CAUCUS (Jan. 31, 2012, 4:03 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/ina-first-a-woman-will-be-senate-parliamentarian/.
402
See Bolton, Alan Frumin, supra note 386 (“Frumin delivered a crucial ruling in
2010 that allowed Senate Democrats to reconcile healthcare legislation with a Housepassed version despite having fewer than 60 votes. The procedural maneuver allowed
the Democratic-controlled Congress to pass landmark legislation that was on the
brink of failure.”).
403
See Mary Jacoby, Dole Aide Dove Is New Senate Parliamentarian, ROLL CALL, Jan.
12, 1995. Interestingly, Dove expressed approval for the use of reconciliation by Joe
Biden, as President of the Senate, along with actual parliamentary rulings by Biden as
chair of Senate proceedings. Garance Franke-Ruta, Former Senate Parliamentarian: Biden
Could Play Big Role in Reconciliation Process, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2010, 11:31 AM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/03/former-senate-parliamentarian.html.
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It would seem, then, that the role of Senate Parliamentarian is not
necessarily one for those interested in job security. Rather than being a
fully independent figure, the Parliamentarian serves at the pleasure of
the majority. While the Parliamentarian can — and often does —
make independent rulings on rules questions, several holding the
position have been done away with when those rulings have gone
against the majority’s wishes. At least one of those rulings has been
related to reconciliation, and what is more, the removal of such a
figure is not likely to have a high apparent public cost. That the firings
have come frequently in the past three decades indicates that the
public does not hold the Senate majority accountable or in contempt
for essentially ejecting the referee. While the Parliamentarian’s offense
no doubt needs to be egregious in the eyes of the majority to warrant
firing, the definition of what is or is not egregious no doubt changes
with each legislative session, and is likely to hinge on the salience of
the legislation at issue rather than the substance of the ruling itself. In
terms of reconciliation, or any other rules question in the Senate, then,
the Parliamentarian is a decidedly imperfect gatekeeper. The
Parliamentarian provides little as a meaningful check for highly salient
policies. Without this oversight, or likely judicial oversight, the
decision over whether majoritarianism or minoritarianism is to prevail
in the Senate is essentially up to the majority.
CONCLUSION: MAJORITY POWER OVER MINORITARIAN POWER
In avoiding the political question of the legal fate of the filibuster,
the Supreme Court will be practicing the judicial art of “not doing” —
refusing to either check another branch or legitimate its actions.404 But
“not doing” is not the same as doing nothing; judicial avoidance
always involves doing something other than checking or legitimating,
such as permitting prior judgments to have a policy effect, frustrating
or checking a prior legislative or official decision, or allowing lower
courts to engage in constitutional experimentation.405 The avoidance
we have described in this Part does not translate to the Court having
no effect; rather, it constitutes a decision to “leave the other
institutions, particularly the legislature, free . . . to make or remake
their own decisions.”406

404
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 200-01 (1986).
405
Id.
406
Id. at 202.
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Respecting departmentalism means allowing another branch to
determine its own rules, which translates to permitting the
manipulation of those rules by whomever or whatever controls that
branch. Despite its long history of minoritarian power,
institutionalized through norms and rules such as the filibuster, the
default for the Senate, like any collective institution, is majority rule
— and so majority control. If we are correct that the Supreme Court
will not take a case about the filibuster under ordinary circumstances
— that is, absent an individual injury beyond diminution of voting
power, or some overreach by the Senate that impacts the separation of
powers — then the future of the minoritarian filibuster lies in the
hands of the Senate majority. But that does not mean that
majoritarianism will win out over minoritarianism, only that the
Senate majority has power over minoritarian power.
Consequently, the extensive references by both sides of the debate
to constitutional arguments for and against the filibuster are
essentially just political rhetoric. Although arguments can be made for
constitutional support or opposition to whether a simple majority can
change a supermajority rule, the constitutional legitimacy of such a
change is ultimately irrelevant if the courts will not hear the case. As
such, adverting to legal argumentation is theater aimed at political
persuasion, not serious preparations for significant litigation.
That result seems appropriate, given that although much is made of
minoritarian traditions, unlike the rest of the separation-of-powers
scheme, there is nothing in the Constitution about a 60 person (or any
other) supermajoritarian voting requirement in either chamber. So
judicial intervention would be speculative, at best, which perhaps
illustrates the wisdom behind judicial avoidance in the circumstances.
Legal precedent may offer little guidance — beyond the
determination of the courts to offer no guidance — but political
science models may also be of limited help in picking winners and
losers between filibuster advocates and its potential reformers. The
problem is that positive political theory models are used to map the
impact of institutional arrangements on outcomes, including
legislation; but they are typically not designed for predicting what
those arrangements will be. For instance, Keith Krehbiel argues that
the individual preferences of key members of the legislative process
will determine what policy outcomes will emerge.407 Those key
members include, importantly, those individual senators whose policy
ideals lie on the distribution of senatorial ideological preferences at the
407
See generally KREHBIEL, supra note 15, at 95 (arguing that individual preferences
of key members of the legislative process is determinative of policy outcomes).
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two points of the filibuster (ten to the left and the right of the
majority). The relative placement of the pivotal filibuster points, along
with other vetoes, determines whether a policy proposal will pass or
not, which, inferring backwards, determines what policies will be
proposed.408 But this analysis is premised on the existence of the
filibuster, and so tells us little of whether that veto point will continue
to exist, or its likely future form.
Looking to the text of internal Senate procedure provides little
guidance either. Whether the Senate’s rules, including the filibuster,
can be changed by a simple majority — other than on the first day of
the session, however long that day is defined to be — is hotly
disputed. But the central interpreter of those rules, the
Parliamentarian, only has power over the Senate to the extent that the
Senate continues to want him to have power — otherwise he gets
fired. Without judicial oversight or any meaningful oversight by the
Parliamentarian, then realistically, a simple majority can decide that
all that is required to change the rules is a simple majority — not
because of subtleties of law or tradition, but because they say so, and
nobody can effectively say otherwise.
That is not to predict that the filibuster will be reformed. In fact, we
predict the opposite, that there will be little meaningful reform of the
filibuster in the near to medium future. But that is not because of any
rule or law; rather it is because of political reality. Senate majorities
face coordination problems that disable them from overcoming their
shared interest in filibuster reform, due to a triune pull: the salience of
localism and particularism, institutionalized risk aversion, and the
path dependence created by stickiness of norms.
Those effects are only likely to be undermined by changes in the
Senate that are larger than just filibuster reform, such as continued
increases in party discipline and ideological polarization. If the trend
that began in the 1960s continues,409 whereby the Democrats and
Republicans act as homogenous, disciplined counterweights to one
another, then a majority may have the will to meaningfully reform the
filibuster. But in that case, it will be because Congress will have moved
408
Others have applied this logic to predict various legal outcomes, as well as the
more general impact of the judiciary. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John
Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523, 531-34 (1992).
409
See discussion supra Part I.C. In addition to the changes described therein,
another element pushing toward greater party discipline is the dramatic rise in the use
of primaries in presidential elections. See AUSTIN RANNEY, CURING THE MISCHIEFS OF
FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA 137 (1975) (describing the history of primary
election reform, beginning in 1968, and arguing that primaries have led to the
fractionalization and disintegration of party organizations).
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away from Madison’s scheme of government by minorities, and toward
majoritarianism.410 That would constitute a far larger change to the
political system, with far greater ramifications for legal outcomes, than
reform of the filibuster.
Otherwise, filibuster reform depends on enough minority coalitions
coalescing against the majority — an unlikely outcome, given
legislative incentives. In the absence of strengthened party discipline,
then, change to the filibuster will come not through reform, but
through the continued ascension of reconciliation. What began as a
desperate budget balancing mechanism has become one of the primary
means by which majorities pass important controversial legislation —
both financial and substantive legislative policies. So change to the
filibuster has only come through either a sly or largely accidental
amendment process. Even then, as we have seen, reconciliation has
not always been fully exploited because of the minoritarian interests
promoted by localism and risk aversion. But the third institutional
characteristic we identified, path dependence, has meant that
reconciliation has remained, enabling the majority to gradually
reassert itself even without filibuster reform. Majoritarianism, then,
will not assert itself with dramatic flourish through reform of the
filibuster, that mechanism that defied reform and kept civil rights and
other policy innovation at bay for so many decades. Rather, it will be
through slightly slippery Senate maneuverings and manipulation of
the rules — which seems only appropriate for determining the
ultimate fate of that accidental minoritarian weapon, the filibuster.

410
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 317, 321 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
2003) (arguing that oppression of society by its rulers is best avoided by creating “so
many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a
majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable”).

